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ABSTRACT 
There are significant gaps in the United States Navy Submarine Force’s ability to 
integrate and manage Information Assurance requirements (IA), Information Technology 
(IT) manpower, End-to-End security, IT equipment, IT training, and applicable 
documentation that meet the intent of the “Design for Undersea Submarine Warfare” 
initiative promulgated in July 2011.  
Furthermore, the Submarine Force lacks common criteria for IA integration as a 
system of systems. IT operators and system administrators must understand the concept 
of end-to-end security. Senior leadership should understand the end-to-end security 
concept so as to understand the cause and effect on overall ship mission and 
vulnerabilities. 
Organizational governance must raise the level of awareness as to network 
security protection. Training, personnel, and equipment, should connect with ethics and 
security practices for total End-to-End Security. A paradigm shift in watchstanding must 
take place. Information Technician Submarines (ITS) duties are no longer a collateral 
duty. Submarine communications division and ITS division merging has the potential to 
solve the manning and watchstanding challenges. Senior enlisted leadership and senior 
communications officer leadership should take the lead on this merger, with command 
and control element support.  
Military procurement system is more oriented on acquiring platforms, not cross-
platform sections. A more cohesive interface between the TYCOMS and the acquisition 
corps is needed.  
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The submarine Information Technician Submarines (ITS) rating is in its infancy. Support 
in the form of equipment training and personnel is, too. Similarly, the understanding of 
end-to-end security and information assurance requirements management is also in its 
infancy. The new IT is rating is in charge of maintaining submarine networks from 
unclassified to top secret special compartment information and higher. These networks 
are the “other combat system” and must be treated as such. In order for the afloat 
command and control element to manage this other combat system like all other systems 
on submarines, commanding officers expect support infrastructure for proper training, 
equipment, and personnel. Unlike other systems onboard, and due to the networks 
autonomous nature at times, the submarine network(s) require a certain level of 
information assurance and end-to-end security due to the submarine networks ability to 
reach off hull like a virtual brow that can allow anything to cross- this can be a significant 
security risk making our submarines externally vulnerable. This external threat is not 
alone. Internal threat on board our submarines is primarily from of poor level of 
knowledge at the system administrator level and poor level of knowledge of information 
assurance requirements management at the executive level.  
Quality sailors manage our onboard networks, like the rest of our systems on 
board the submarine. Allowing anything less, places the ship into inherent risk every time 
it is plugged into the global information gig. Not every sailor who volunteers or gets 
volunteered to be a submarine ITS should be doing that job. Scrutiny of personnel to 
manage our onboard networks should be held to a high standard. What makes the ITS 
rate different from the Information Technician (IT) rate in the rest of the Navy?  Why 
does the submarine community need to spawn a separate rate?  This question should 
bring forth  two separate possibilities; (1) The rest of the Navy has not managed the IT 
rate enough that the submarine force had to set up a separate rate or (2) low personnel 
numbers in submarine manning requires greater versatility from each petty officer. Can 
the submarine force save money and use the stock IT rate or force the multi-capability 
farther down the  organizational hierarchy? 
 xx 
There are few qualified leadership positions at the ISIC level and above to assist 
submarines with information assurance management. Force shaping at the Limited Duty 
Officer level and procurement of a new Information Systems Submarine Chief Warrant 
Officer level will invest in permanent manpower relief.  
After three years of the creation of the ITS rate, only now in 2013 is there an 
official ITS training pipeline. Unlike other systems on board a submarine that have a 
tendency to remain somewhat static, networking and all that it implies will remain fluid 
from the DoD level down to the deck plate. It is still up to the afloat command to train the 
majority of their ITS personnel for the next few years. Leaders must demand nothing less 
than top-notch on-board training. If personnel are not training themselves or new 
personnel are not being trained via the official ITS training pipeline for equipment on 
board, then detailed feedback on the external supplied training must be  swift and clear.  
Submarine networking equipment follows the standard program of record 
acquisition process. Fleet feedback from afloat platforms is crucial to improving the 
network systems and system of systems for proper interoperability to meet capability. 
Guidance at all levels from various organizations creates myriad instructions, 
technical manuals, and messages from operational organizations to defense contracting 
program managers. Commanding officers currently do not know what they are supposed 
to know -this continues to be a problem. The number of personnel to properly manage 
this continuously changing guidance are few, but increasing slowly. Managing the sea of 
guidance should not be left up to the afloat unit alone. There is a better solution that 
involves continuous feedback from onboard and iterations of guidance until a mature 
product supports submarine. 
The Navy procurement and acquisition process, specifically test evaluation and 
design review, must be fully understood by senior leadership other than those involved 
directly with defense acquisition as a program manager or a liaison for TYCOM. The 
checks and balances between program growth versus military needs and requirements are 
insufficient in preventing adequate efficiency before achieving effectiveness. The 
relationship between acquisition leadership and TYCOM is more of a dichotomy- split 
 xxi 
and non-overlapping. A more cohesive connection needs to be made between TYCOM 
and the procurement and acquisition leadership. 
End-to-end security strengthening of our information assurance is the goal. End-
to-end security parallels the end-to-end reliability mechanisms so elegantly implemented 
in the Internet, specifically transmission control protocol (TCP). Without reaching this 
goal, the management and employment of our networks is inherently at risk. IT operators 
and system administrators must understand the concept of end-to-end security so as to put 
in place necessary measures for a proper end-to-end security model. Senior leadership 
should understand the end-to-end security concept so as to understand the cause and 
effect on overall ship mission and support functions. Network operation, security, and 
administration are no longer a collateral duty. Treating it as such prevents long-term 
investment in strengthening our information assurance and end-to-end security across the 
virtual brow—there is a better solution.  
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There are significant gaps in the United States Navy (USN) Submarine Force’s 
ability to integrate and manage Information Assurance requirements (IA), Information 
Technology (IT) manpower, End-to-End security, IT equipment, IT training, and 
applicable documentation that meets the intent of the “Design for Submarine Warfare” 
initiative promulgated in July 2011. The DUSW’s intent is to have a shared sense of main 
objectives, and to align multiple efforts” (Caldwell, Richardson and Breckenridge 2011). 
Furthermore, the Submarine Force lacks common criteria for IA integration as a 
system of systems (SoS), when such an SoS is defined as a structured methodology to 
standardize and document IA requirements, IT requirements management, IT manpower, 
end-to-end security paralleled with end-to-end reliability, IT equipment and training, IA 
physical/functional/behavioral network boundaries, and applicable documentation that 
meets the intent of the “New Design for Submarine Warfare” initiative.  
This thesis presents an analysis of the current position and possible solutions for 
the Submarine Force to properly and effectively institutionalize, at the Type Commander 
(TYCOM) and afloat command level, IA integration as an SoS with an understanding of 
End-to-End security across all platform architectures and vertically from the most junior 
submarine IT workforce personnel to afloat Commanding Officer, Major Commander, 
Type Commanders (TYCOM) and sponsored Program Managers (PM). These solutions 
are currently available and able to be implemented without significant impact to the 
Submarine Fleet budget, manpower, or networks.  
In this thesis, the introduction of a new concept representation of “information 
assurance trade-space” will be used. It encompasses not only the generally accepted 
definition of IA but also includes the additional elements of training, personnel, and 
equipment. Figure 1 depicts a visual representation of this new concept or representation.  
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Of note: Cyber is an overused term with multiple meanings. Readers of this thesis 
are encouraged to think of the term “Cyber” as something a little more analogous to 
“network centric.” Additionally, tackling improving information systems security is more 
of a systems function. To address improving information security is more of a personnel 
and policy function. 
 
Figure 1.   Information Assurance Tradespace 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research will address the questions of “How can the Submarine Force better 
prepare and improve its Information Technician (IT) personnel, equipment, and training 
to meet increasing submarine warfare requirements worldwide?  How can this be 
accomplished while employing undersea forces and delivering future undersea 
warfighting capabilities without further unnecessarily sacrificing valuable monetary and 
manpower resources?” 
Furthermore, this research will analyze the capability of the Submarine Force’s 
“New Design for Undersea Warfare” (DUSW) initiative, described as the ability to “fight 
our virtual ship in the cyber domain as capably as we do in the undersea domain” 
(Caldwell and Richardson 2011, 4). 
  
3 
The aim of this research is to provide submarine combatant commanders, 
submarine type commanders, submarine squadron commodores, and submarine afloat 
commanding officers with an improved comprehension of the concepts necessary for the 
Submarine Force’s ability to fight the virtual ship in the cyber domain as capably as the 
undersea domain. The term virtual ship should not imply improved information systems 
but rather a comparison of warfare in a physical battle space of ether land, air, or sea with 
the virtual concept of network warfare. 
C. DEFINITIONS AND DOCUMENTATIONS OF INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE 
Information Assurance (IA) is a phrase that is often used and equally 
misunderstood. As the term IA matured over the years, technology has become younger 
and more advanced. In other words, new technology is emerging so fast it is slow to 
mature. Since the subject of this thesis is IA as a system of systems in the submarine 
force, it is appropriate to address the basics of what generally has been adopted as the 
definition and understanding of IA. In addition to a basic definition, some of the multiple 
meanings and definitions IA has taken on over the past decade will also be discussed. 
Currently, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) website alone maintains 338 
line items under their policy guidance webpage that have some form of connection with 
IA or information security (DISA website 2012). It is with no surprise that all Echelon 
Commands levels may not fully understand or be able to keep up with policy guidance 
pertaining to IA and all that it entails.  
A generally accepted definition of IA is provided in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Joint Publication 1–02 as measures that “protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring: availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 




D. DEFENSE IN DEPTH AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
“IA is achieved when information and information systems are protected against 
such attacks through the application of security services” (NSA IA Group, 2013). 
Overall, the concept of IA includes the measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring integrity, authentication, availability, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation. A closer review shows IA broken down into two parts; protection of 
the information itself (authenticity and confidentiality) and protection of the information 
system infrastructure (integrity and availability). It is important to understand that 
protections of the infrastructure alone may have little benefit to protecting the 
information. In parallel, there are measures to protect the information (data) and measures 
to protect the information system (infrastructure); the protection measures for each are 
generally different. These same measures, or capabilities, of these services should allow 
for the defense of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and 
reaction capabilities. In other words, in addition to incorporating protection mechanisms, 
Echelon Two and below commands need to expect vulnerabilities and include attack 
detection tools, policies, procedures, and training that allow them and their IT personnel 
to prepare, react, and recover from these attacks. In other words, what is necessary are 
solid personnel, readiness information management programs at the unit level. This 
layered approach towards people, technology, and operations is also known as “Defense 
in Depth”  IA strategy (NSA IA Group 2013) , which will be covered in this thesis. 
DoD Personnel and Readiness Information Management (P&R IM 2012) IA role 
is to offer guidance and training in the areas of:  
  The Department of Defense Information Assurance Certification and 
Accredition Program (DIACAP). This provides oversight to and/or 
manages the C&A (Certification and Authorization) process on Defense 
Human Resources Activity (DHRA) components’ information systems. 
  Employee awareness training: This covers basic IA principles, security 
threats, risks, physical security, and so on.  
  Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM). This includes 
producing required documentation, ensuring timely reporting of 
compliance statistics for each Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert 
(IAVA) and aggreatating compliance reports. 
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  Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs):  This includes evaluations of the 
privacy impact of any substantially revised or new IT systems that collect, 
maintain, or disseminate PII (Personnal Identifable Information) and for 
those systems or  
 projects that convert PII paper-based records to electronic systems.  
(P&RIM 2012) 
The DoD IA Portal website is the one-stop-shop for Information Assurance 
Support Environment (DISA website 2012). IA may be a focal point for the Defense in 
Depth strategy, but policy addressing Information Assurance is different at every tier 
echelon level. For example, Information Assurance is part of the title in nine different 
DOD 8500 series instructions on the iase.disa.mil website (DISA website 2012). The 
Joint Chiefs 6510 series instruction has two Information Assurance titled subject lines, 
the Marine Corps has one MCO5239.2a, titled Information Assurance Program, the 
Army has one information assurance instruction called a AR 25–2, and DISA maintains 
one Information Assurance policy for their employees only called DISA 630–230–19 
(DISA website 2013). 
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
Some policies are used by multiple organizations to suit their own special 
requirements. Information Assurance policy at the DoD 8500 series level documents 
promulgates the “whats” with respect to the requirements. As lower Tiers, or Echelons, 
start to generate their own policy, the “whats” start to morph into the “hows” by the time 
they reach the Tier, or Echelon Three. The list of policy and guidance for the DoD 
section maintains 53 line items and the Department of the Navy list three line items. The 
IA strategy section has six line items. The observation to be made from this list and 
review of the DISA policy and guidance website is the staggering amount of policy and 
guidance that appears to be a top heavy amount in the DoD, while Echelon Commands 
One through Three are left to create their own policy and guidance to meet higher level 
policy and guidance by uniformed personnel who are not necessarily experts or scholars 
of Information Assurance. A contributing factor to this offset is the high number of 
civilian IT and IA professionals at the program of record and program sponsor level, 
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defense contracting sector, and the DoD. In addition, observations of the body of 
attendance at the National Security Agency IA symposium in Nashville, TN in 2011, 
made it clear that active duty IT/IA experts are in the minority (NSA IA symposium 
2012). 
The Information Assurance label that has been well branded for many years 
appears to be being phased out and replaced with a new title catch phrase called “Cyber 
Security” by the DoD IT/IA community (NSA IA symposium 2012). Although Cyber 
Security may be an appropriate term for being connected to the Global Information Grid 
(GIG), it should not replace the industry accepted definition of Information Assurance 
that still is used in a mainstream understanding. 
1. TYCOM AND UNIT LEVEL 
The IA goal for commands should be to chart a path towards compliance in the 
Submarine Force, through proper preparation and support of their IT staff and not just 
following the tides of expected reactionary requirements to the last IA violation or 
TYCOM inquiry. Proper documentation is paramount in preparation. 
The various documentation related to the Submarine Local Area Network 
(SUBLAN) consists of Department of Defense and Navy instructions, Type Commander 
CYBER-1 publications, Specific Information Security Policies, the Common PC 
Operating System Environment (COMPOSE) Requirements, user guides as provided by 
various program management organizations,  guidance originated by Commander Tenth 
Fleet (COMTENTHFLT), and other military support organizations, and a constant 
barrage of official Naval messages. With the overwhelming amount of documentation 
made available, not all of it covers the entire spectrum of network security and 
troubleshooting there is to consider. As networks advance, problems arise that are not 
always covered with documentation or training and usually end up chasing the ever-
expanding SUBLAN network. Submarine networks should not be thought of as utilities; 





II. END-TO-END SECURITY CONCEPT 
A. WHAT IS END-TO-END SECURITY 
End-to-end security and the various forms it takes is a phrase that is often used 
and equally misunderstood. “End-to-end security,” “end-to-end network security,” “end-
to-end security-defense-in-depth,” et cetera, are all terms with many meanings. End- to-
end can mean data origin to data destination—through the operating system, while in 
storage, over the wire, over the radio, in routers—where data is never unprotected, from 
the point where the data originates to the point where it is destined.  
Another way to think about end-to-end security, within the context of Information 
Assurance, is to think of it as “from writer to reader” or “cradle to the grave” protection 
of data and information. Regardless of how it is phrased, end-to-end security can be 
tested when it is observed that the protection is effective and protection is never removed 
anywhere through the communication or operating systems. For the purposes of this 
thesis, protected data will be considered to be data that maintains confidentiality, 
authenticity, and availability. 
This section focuses on end-to-end security as a summation of the information 
assurance trade space previously described. The information assurance trade space, 
discussed in this thesis, is traditional information assurance (confidentiality, 
integrity/authenticity, availability) and additional integrated information assurance 
(training, personnel, equipment), which together are capable of providing end-to-end 
security. Although integrity is a lessor subset of authenticity, non-repudiation, as used in 
the IA context, is also a subset of authenticity as it is applied to a receipt system such as 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). An application of authenticity is digitally signed 
(S/MIME) e-mail. Within the integrated IA category of equipment, software security 
tools should be included as a subset due to Information Systems (IS) equipment’s 
dependency on software to supplement hardware or act solely independent. 
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B. WHAT DOES END-TO-END SECURITY PROVIDE 
All end systems should attach to a routable LAN/WAN of some form. But not all 
communication systems that terminate from end user to end user are 100% secure. The 
corollary is that no end system should put data onto that LAN that has not been protected. 
End-to-end security must protect data in storage as well as in transit. Using the term 
“protected” does not mean encrypted—there are no cases where authenticity is not a 
requirement, so protection should always include digital signatures. If confidentiality is 
required, then “‘protection” includes encryption too. If the communications system that 
handles the data is a routable network, then it has the highest chance of becoming secure 
from end-to-end. 
C. WHAT IS NOT PROVIDED WITHOUT END-TO-END SECURITY 
Unlike shore based enterprise networks, such as Navy and Marine Corps Intranet 
(NMCI) or Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) Navy Enterprise Network 
(ONE-Net) that use Common Access Cards (CACs) to authenticate users, almost all 
shipboard networks at the General Service (GENSER) classification level and lower do 
not have a method of digitally signing data from that command or user; nor is there a 
bulk data encryption process. An entire ship with user logon and password, as the only 
method of network access, can and does create its own data objects in a shared 
environment. While this may assure the authenticity of the organization that owns the 
data, the individual user who created the data is not authenticated in such a fashion as to 
provide traceability—in short, from actual writer to reader. An example of how data 
flows through the OSI model is provided in Figure 2.  
Due to implementation of this type security, this middle ground continues to 
challenge networks and their administrators, especially if the physical or network security 
fails—the data can be compromised. 
In 2010, the Navy implemented Computer Tasking Order (CTO) 10–25, as issued 
by COMNAVNETWARCOM, an attempt to provide an extra measure of security for 
what was considered removable media CTO 10–25 is specifically intended to utilize 
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Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Host Based Security System (HBSS) software and 
Navy policy to prevent access to any removable media hardware or software such as a 
USB device. CD/DVD write capability is disabled on each workstation by the system 
administrator. The misconception by most is that the implemented HBSS is 100% 
prevention of unauthorized removable media for onboard workstations. HBSS does not 
control the data itself. In fact, HBSS onboard submarines only detect any USB device 
once it has been plugged into the host computer. The IT operator must review the logs 
manually to discover and investigate the USB violation. 
 
Figure 2.   OSI Model 
D. THE OSI AND TCP MODEL 
Two basic questions should be considered when addressing end-to-end security 
with respect to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model: 
 What layer of the ISO model is security being applied to? 
 What is the object that is being protected?   
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These are two different ways of asking exactly the same question. For example, if the 
object being protected is a datagram, then the network layer in question is Layer 3. End-
to-end network security in reference to the Internet happens at Layers 6 or 7, the 
presentation and application layers. Lower layer protections are not 100% adequate, 
because the scope of those layers is less than end-to-end. Inadequate examples include, 
but not limited to, the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) and the Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS), because there are no protections within the end systems’ 
operating systems. 
More prudent examples of end-to-end security within an intranet are signed and 
encrypted e-mail, Secure Shell (SSH) (SSH is a secure network protocol used for remote 
secure network services between a server and a client) and Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP), which is similar to how the Skype application works. 
Figure 3 is provided to compare the OSI model to the TCP/IP model. The OSI 
model is a reference model and the TCP/IP model is an implementation of the OSI 
model. The TCP/IP model was derived from the DoD’s original Advance Research 
Projects Agency Network (ARPNET) and adopted by the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) in the late 1970s as a framework for describing all functions required 
of an open interconnected network. It is a widely known and accepted reference model in 





Figure 3.   OSI vs TCP Model 
The security implication is that security implemented at Layers 6 and 7, the 
application and presentation layers are embedded in the application, thus are not part of 
the infrastructure. E-mail signature/encryption is a classic example—these security 
functions are part of the e-mail user agent implementation. Another example is password 
protection of a document that is digitally signed or the use of Voice Over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP). 
E. OSI MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The following is detailed description of data flow through the OSI model depicted 
in Figure 2 with respect to end-to-end security concept described in Article II of this 
research. 
Layer 1: this is part of the transport service. For example, radio communications 
use key generators to encrypt the data. This is a Layer 1 encryption device, which does 
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nothing more than byte substitution. The object protected is individual bytes (frame and 
IP datagram headers included).  
Layer 2: The functions of Layer 2 are 1) interface to Layer 3 and 2) media access 
control. This layer can encrypt a frame, or individual bytes of data. It can be argued that 
this constitutes Layer 2 protection. Either way, the scope of the protection at this layer is 
single-segment—all of these protections must be reversed in order to recover the contents 
of the data.  
Layer 3: Data protection is typically on network segments at Layer 3 or lower. 
There are unclassified, secret, and top secret enclaves that connect to routers at this layer. 
In this case, the object being protected is an IP datagram where the user’s data resides.  
Within Layer 3 Infrastructure are enclaves nested inside enclaves. This is fine for 
infrastructure protection but not for content protection. For example, what if an end 
system such as a computer in the submarine has malware in its OS distribution?  The 
current structural strategy creates a “secure enclave,” inside which data is rarely 
protected. Attempting to achieve data content protection via infrastructure protection has 
varying degrees of success in preventing an outside attacker from compromising sensitive 
data. It has a near-zero success rate in minimizing compromise by individuals already 
inside the enclave; access to the enclave nearly always results in access to all the data in 
the entire enclave. The insider threat or need-to-know concept becomes real and may 
become impossible to address at the system level. The term insider threat is basically any 
accidental or intentional act upon a network by the system administrators or users.  
Layer 4 and 5:  This is the layer that deals with providing a protected connection 
via a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS). These methods are 
normally transparent to the user and protect the data between users or hosts. 
Unfortunately, security is stripped away at the TCP socket on the end users computer. A 
socket is the combination of a host IP address and virtual port number (Dean 2013, 164). 
This, obviously, does not provide “end-to-end security.”  But it does provide end-to-end 
TCP reliability at layer 5 for opening and closing the 3-way handshake so no data gets 
sent without receiver being ready for it. 
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Layers 6 and 7:  This is the application layer and is the start and finish of data by 
users. Layers 6 and7 seem to be routinely omitted in the widely used term end-to-end 
security. The function of Layers 6 and 7 is where application interfaces function. Think 
of this layer where the user opens a word processing program, for example. End-to-end 
security measures cannot be solved at any layers lower than Layer 6 and7. The lower 
layers are all agnostic about applications. For example, a TCP connection is just a 
connection; it does not “care” about whether the connection supports an Internet 
transaction, e-mail transport, or other. 
F. SUMMARY 
End-to-end security is complete data protection from writer to reader as the data 
travels through the entire OSI and TCP/IP model. Due to advancement in 
hardware/firmware, the easiest and most popular protection model is within a network’s 
infrastructure. Simple network access via a token or common access card will not provide 
end-to-end security unless that model is applied and ends at application Layer 7. But, if 
protection is applied to the data from writer to reader and not just the communications 
infrastructure alone, then true end-to-end security starts and ends at (application) Layer 7, 
before data is sent on the network to the end user. Therefore, end-to-end security 
measures cannot be truly solved at any layers lower than that without addressing the 
entire OSI/TCP/IP model working together within the IA trade space as a System of 
Systems.  
The development of the TCP and IP parallels the development of the OSI model. 
IP is connectionless and stateless which means that there’s no sense of end-to-end 
connections. Packets of data can get lost for many reasons, but the connectionless nature 
of IP means that we have a dynamite ability to transparently add alternate routes and 
improve system availability.  
IT operators and system administrators must understand the concept of end-to-end 
security so as to put in place necessary measures for a proper end-to-end security model. 
Lack of understanding of this concept by submarine network program managers 
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inadvertently causes a lack of acquisition and policy support necessary to keep up with 
dynamic network security measures. Senior leadership should understand the end-to-end 
security concept in order to understand the cause and effect on overall ship mission and 
support functions. They need to know what questions to ask and demand closure from 
TYCOM via the program managers. 
It is recommended further research and trade studies be conducted for end-to-end 
security solutions onboard submarine networks such as SUBLAN. The use of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), Common Access Card (CAC), or similar token access card used in 
conjunction with the proper application will provide end-to-end security at all layers of 
the OSI and TCP/IP model. This will not only prevent loss of sensitive information via 
loss of data, but make it easier to mitigate the insider threat.  
It is recommended further research be conducted to insert end-to-end security 
training into the submarine ITS training pipeline. Currently, the only network security 




III. TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 
A. BACKGROUND 
One of the most technologies-driven product architectures in the last 20 years is 
the Internet. If there is anything which demonstrates the power of a routable network, it is 
the fact that the fundamental core of the Internet is virtually unchanged since it was first 
conceived of and then has undergone various changes to how it is seen and used today.  
In the early 90s, people used to dial into a friend’s Bulletin Board System (BBS) 
with a modem. In the early days of computers, this type of connecting to each other was 
referred to as a point-to-point connection, from a computer with a modem that would 
direct dial into another modem that connected to a computer on the other end. They were 
typically 64K baud data rate, which was the typical operational speed of that time period; 
not incredibly fast, for the most part, but generally reliable. Data was transmitted in a 
First-in-First-Out (FFO) serial transmission method. This connection typically took place 
on a leased line or a switched circuit. 
But three basic concepts changed everything. These three basic key concepts of 
packet routing, best effort, and protocol hierarchy are the reason the Internet as “The 
Internet” and has survived, with its fundamental architecture remaining unchanged. 
The first concept was that of packet routing. The basic concept of packet routing 
is where the host, or user workstation, data is specifically routed by an Internet Protocol 
(IP) address to another specific host or user workstation. 
The second concept  was an idea, summed up with the phrase “best effort is good 
enough” which was a huge breakthrough concept. Although all communications systems 
can be viewed as best effort in some way or another, best effort is also a result of 
significant improvement in bandwidth efficiency that packet switching delivers over 
circuit-switching.  
The third concept  was that of a “protocol hierarchy,” that is, a very careful and 
clear organization to the structure of the data that moves, starting from a user 
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workstation, across the Internet, to a final destination. The Open Systems Interconnection 
(OSI) model is the primary model used to describe this concept. An example of the OSI 
model is shown in Figure 2. 
1. Data Packet Routing 
The best way to understand the concept of packet routing is to contrast it to a 
telephone conversation. Telephone systems are basic circuit-switching systems. Before 
one can make a call, the line must be clear or not busy. In a telephone conversation, data 
is transmitted voice to voice in a way that is basically continuous. But the designers of 
the packetized approach chopped up the data into packets; they were not even sure what 
route these data packets were going to take. But just like a telephone system, before the 
first chunk of data can pass, there must be an open path across multiple points across the 
Internet.  
2. Best Effort is Good Enough Concept 
Reliable packets of data were just launched from the sender to the receiver, (or 
workstation to workstation), over unreliable components and getting to their destination 
was just something that was hoped for—the best would have to good enough. If the other 
end receiving the data was overloaded, it would just drop the packet of data and ask the 
originator transmitting the data to send it again. Some of the unreliable components in the 
middle were switches and routers. The designers must have figured, “If we’re going to go 
with packet routing, all we can do is just send the packets and hope for the best.” The 
main takeaway here is any route that the packets hop closer to their destination will work 
and there may be multiple paths to do so. If a route fails, it may be due to congestion and 
the routers direct the packets to alternate routes. This lack of route determination can be 
disconcerting at first, but is extremely resilient and an enormous increase in bandwidth 
efficiency. Although autonomously transparent to the average user, this is the Internet 
concept as it functions today. But then, to compensate, they created a protocol hierarchy, 
which is the third piece of genius. 
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3. Protocol Hierarchy 
This concept is where there is a carefully designed set of encapsulated protocols. 
For a non-engineer or geek, it is difficult to visualize these encapsulated protocols. But 
the best analogy is that of nested Russian dolls, or “a box within a box within a box” 
concept. That essentially is the best way to visualize the Internet Protocol, or IP protocol. 
An IP is this packet of data, also known as a datagram. The end systems do not care what 
happens in the middle of the protocol hierarchy—it is transparent. The IP does not need 
to have any functionality other than one-hop forwarding while TCP provides end-to-end 
integrity which helps prevent lost packets. The tradeoff is TCP is ignorant of how the 
packets come and go in the first place. Architecturally speaking, both of these can be 
labeled “modularity.” In other words, the payoff to this modularity is one can change 
something in one layer of the OSI model, as long as interfaces between the layers are 
intact, and everything else is transparent. Designers can change, hallucinate, and improve 
applications in end systems entirely transparent to the infrastructure.  
The datagram architecture known now  came about because of the success of the 
combination of the three concepts discussed here. This architecture origin provided 
deliverable content on demand by popular demand.  
The Internet was designed to deliver, for the most part, read only content, such as 
webpage. But the way it has been forced, now, to accept content was a function it was 
never really designed for in the first place. Only after the concept of data owners desiring 
to restrict access was there the development of forced two-way secure links, login and 
password requirements, and encryption.  
The most significant driver of this concept was Electronic Commerce 
transactions. The designers or architects of the Internet had no idea what was going to 
become of these three concepts. If they did, the Internet may not exist the way it does 
today because—to an expert in security or an average network technician—it would have 
been evident from the beginning that architecture like this would be vulnerable and has 
an almost complete lack of End-to-End security, which is entirely different from what 




The takeaway from this chapter is to understand the advances in technology that 
have changed product architecture. That product was, and still is, the Internet and its 
ability to function the way it does. Normally a demand will drive a product to be 
developed for s specific purpose. In the case of the concept of the Internet as now known, 
advancement technology itself was the main driver behind the Internet architecture. This 
advancement in technology was felt in the Navy and submarine force and was well taken 




IV. IT-21 TO ITS 
A. IT-21 
1. Background 
In the mid-1990s, the Navy’s new plan to modernize its Information Technology 
ambitions was called “Information Technology for the 21st Century” (Vena 1998). Vena 
focused on competencies of Navy Enlisted IT Personnel for the USN, along with the 
enlisted manpower training and core competencies required to manage this program upon 
which the Navy was embarking . The report well identified training requirements and 
core competencies for enlisted IT specialists. Vena stated, “Will IT training and 
education be an enabler in reaching the goals of Joint Vision 2010 or will the military 
repeat the mistakes of organizations that have tried to solve their problems by 
overemphasizing technology?” (Vena 1998, 2). In other words, the Navy needed to 
change how it trained those personnel who took care of onboard networks in order to 
maintain or improve its network-centric ambitions. A junior ITS sailor should be trained 
and capable of using end-to-end system administration and application security tools. A 
mid-grade ITS sailor should be trained and capable of properly installing, deploying, and 
teaching non-IT crew members how to use those tools securely.  
This thesis picks up certain sections where Vena’s thesis left off by updating 
particular focus areas such as IT workforce trends, organization, required skills et cetera, 
while providing new analysis and synthesis particular to the submarine force such as the 
new IT rate, enlisted and officer IT training and manpower, program and operational 
level processes, IT interoperability to meet capability, and how Information Assurance as 
a system of systems should be considered a mission capability for all submarines.  
B. INFORMATION TECHNICIAN SUBMARINES 
1. Background 
Early on, the submarines Fire-control Technicians (FT) were considered the 
experts, by any early-day definition, in data processing, computers/computing, and 
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networking, due to their extensive training path system. Occasionally, other submarine 
rates that assisted the FT division with onboard networking joined in on the collateral 
duty of managing the ad hoc network onboard. These were also the sailors who were 
among the first to start experimenting with networking personal computers at home, the 
extensive use of dial-up connectivity to a local Bulletin Board System, and then with the 
Internet (and eventually intranets) onboard submarines.  
All of the networks on submarines were being installed as ad-hoc Local Area 
Network (LAN), with only the authority provided by the Commanding Officer (CO) of 
that submarine. Once a couple of boats put together their first LAN, CO envy would 
spread like a computer virus—every CO wanted a LAN. There was no consideration for 
network security, viruses, equipment, or personnel support, and so on. As long as the 
submarine could take advantage of increased productivity and information sharing on 
board and with the submarine Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC), everyone up and 
down the chain of command was satisfied. This was about to change—personal 
computing equipment, networking technology, and increased workloads placed on the ad-
hoc network and the ad-hoc division that supported it forced a course change that was yet 
to be charted. The one thing that was certain was the need for official training path 
system to give sailors the first Navy Enlisted Education Code (NEC) for basic, 
intermediate, and advance networking training. 
2. Pandora’s Box 
The submarine force is experiencing something new that has not been attempted 
in decades—the creation of a new technical submarine enlisted rate called Information 
Technician Submarines (ITS). In the early 1990s, personal computing and basic 
networking found its way into the submarine force. With Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
(COTS) personal computing and networking equipment becoming more efficient and 
affordable, along with smart junior sailors taking up computing as a hobby, it was only a 
matter of time before the afloat submarine force realized the value of networking all the 
computers on board a submarine for official and unofficial purposes. What was not 
realized was the Pandora’s Box that was about to be opened. In other words, it is a 
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process that generates many complicated problems as the result of unwise interference in 
something. At the time, afloat submarines and their shore commands were so fixated on 
the Internet and Intranets and their ability to bring communications to almost real-time, 
the proverbial Pandora’s Box was not even thought about with respect to information 
assurance, manning, manpower, training, equipment, et cetera. The question bears asking: 
“Did technology drive the Submarine Local Area Network (SUBLAN) product or did 
fleet requirements drive the SUBLAN product?”  The SUBLAN network architecture is 
an Internet Protocol (IP) technology driven product. A basic appreciable description of IP 
based driven technology is provided in this thesis and a SUBLAN description is provided 
in Appendix A. 
C. SUMMARY 
The Navy’s IT-21 program was off to a good start with establishing a plan to 
modernize, standardize, and take advantage of the new networking technology that 
enabled Command to communicate in a non-traditional fashion with a non-traditional 
system that was maintained by non-traditional sailors as a collateral duty. IT-21 worked 
for many years until networking became less of a luxury and more of a requirement. IT-
21 program was not update as fast as technology and the demand for connectivity 
increased. Subsequently, the need for higher trained and dedicated operators, technicians, 
and officers also increased. Almost two decades later it became apparent that the concept 
of a new battlespace may exist and a new design to deal with that battlespace and 
revitalize traditional battlespace warfare was needed. 
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V. DESIGN FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE JULY 2011 
A. BACKGROUND 
Discussing the future of undersea warfare design, J.F. Caldwell and J.M. 
Richardson and R.P. Breckenridge state: “we will need to fight our virtual ship in the 
cyber domain as capably as we fight in the undersea domain” (Caldwell, Richardson, and 
Breckenridge 2011, 4). The question becomes, then, how can the Submarine Force 
Combatant Commanders better prepare and improve its Information Technician (IT) 
personnel, equipment, and training to meet increasing submarine warfare requirements 
worldwide, while employing undersea forces and delivering future undersea warfighting 
capabilities without unnecessarily sacrificing valuable monetary and manpower 
resources? Further description of the DUSW is shown in Appendix B. 
The answer to this question postulated in this thesis is by a thorough and solid 
paradigm shift in understanding Information Assurance (IA) as a systems of systems in 
the submarine force that revolves around a trade space comprised the traditional 
understanding of IA being confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also integrated with 
proper interoperability training, personnel, and equipment that meets current and future 
capability. 
B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE GAP IN DUSW 
The Design for Undersea Warfare (DUSW) is a current and active plan to impress 
and build upon a force-wide realignment for developing, supporting, operating, and 
employing through three primary key focus areas called the “Three Lines of Effort 
(LOE).”  These LOEs are “Ready forces, Effective Employment, and Future Force 







One of the three LOEs related to IA or Submarine IT are: 
 Ready Undersea Forces 
o Establish ITS rating and LAN Division is listed as an initiative 
with no focus area, instruction, or description 
o Improve IA afloat and ashore is listed as a focus area with no 
instruction 
o Establish an Information Assurance Workforce (IAWF) program 
to manage the ITS sailors’ qualification progression. 
 Effective Employment 
 Future Force Capabilities 
The intention behind the DUSW Lines of Effort is to provide enough specifics to 
define the objective clearly, while providing enough flexibility to encourage initiative 
from the most junior sailor to the commanding officer of the ship. Each LOE maintains a 
list of specific focus areas, with a corresponding initiative, instruction, and an aggregate 
description of all three. The line of effort, “Establish ITS rating and LAN Division” is 
listed with no supporting focus area, instruction, or description. For the first time in many 
decades, the submarine force created a new enlisted rate called Information Technician 
Submarines (ITS). In the submarine force’s haste to accomplish this task in time for 
publishing the DUSW, an opportunity for a more appropriate accompanying focus area, 
instruction, and description or plan was missed. This thesis will examine the personnel 
and training aspect of the new ITS rating, its shortfalls, and a more appropriate support 
measure of the LOEs. 
The line of effort, “Establish Information Assurance Work Force (IAWF),” is also 
listed with no supporting focus area, instruction, or description. This LOE initiative 
should have been omitted because the IAWF was not created by the submarine force. 
IAWF was actually established by the DoD in 2004 under the DoD reference 8500–01M 
and currently revised in 2012 as Information Assurance Workforce Improvement 
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Program. Thus, a missed opportunity in creating a Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
was inadvertently made. 
The focus area “Improving IA afloat and ashore,” lists initiative as “Information 
Assurance Portable Electronic Devices Policy,” lists the instruction number as “NA” or 
not applicable, with a description  to develop a single portable electronic device (PED) 
instruction that will support the entire submarine force. This effort was  expected to 
improve commonality between CSP & CSL and improve IA afloat and ashore”.  It is a 
conceptual error to assume (more accurately in this case) that a Portable Electronic 
Device (PED) policy is an appropriate or accurate policy to improve IA afloat and ashore. 
Proper IA references were and still are available during authoring of DUSW. OPNAV 
5339.1C Navy Information Assurance Program is the baseline starting point for Naval IA 
policy.  
C. DESIGN FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE UPDATE 2012 
In November 2012, the Submarine Force Commanders published an update to the 
DUSW. The update built upon the force-wide alignment previously generated in July 
2011.  
Line of Effort, Number 1 is designated “provide ready forces,” and this is stated 
as “Support organizations must develop a more capable shipboard suite, revise our TTP 
for emerging threats, and protect our own cyber networks.” The evidence of improvement 
to be provided for this line of effort is “IA assessments; deployed mission performance 
evaluations; Tactical Readiness Exams (TRE) results” (Caldwell, Richardson, and 
Breckenridge 2012, 5). 
Not until the next anticipated update will this evidence of improvement be fully 
evaluated. 
D. SUMMARY 
DUSW is a plan to get the submarine force on a new dead reckoning course. Even 
with some minor shortfalls with DUSW addressing Lines of Effort for IA/IT/LAN 
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systems, programs, and personnel, a deeper reach to leverage the proper level of experts 
already embedded in the submarine force will ensure the DUSW spirit of intent behind 
those LOEs.  
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VI. INFORMATION ASSURANCE PHYSICAL, FUNCTIONAL, 
AND BEHAVIORIAL BOUNDARIES 
A. BACKGROUND 
Information Assurance (IA) is not without boundaries. Through the study of 
Systems Architecture and reviewing IA holistically as a system of systems, the topic of 
“information assurance boundaries” relates directly to the Defense in Depth (DiD) 
Strategy layers.  
The DiD, a layered approach towards people, technology, and operations, has 
many iterations. For example, Cisco’s DiD with respect to a “unified Contact Center 
Enterprise (CCE) solution” (Cisco Inc. 2009) functionally correlates to IA boundaries. 
When it comes to physical, functional, and behavioral IA boundaries, the physical 
boundary is the closest thing that directly correlates to the physical boundary described in 
the Defense in Depth Strategy. Knowledge of the relationship between these three 
boundaries in the traditional Defense in Depth Strategy layers originates from the 
author’s personal observations and synthesis for many years as an Information Assurance 
manager, communications manager, and security manager for seven submarines and 
multiple submarine squadrons. For the purpose of this discussion, the physical, 
functional, and behavioral boundaries discussed in this context will correlate to the 
individual layers. Figure 4 depicts the author’s conceptional IA boundaries’ relationship 
model to a DiD model. 
 For example, the physical security layer is directly related to this physical 
IA boundary.  
 The functional boundary correlates to the host security, internal network, 
and perimeter security Defense in Depth layers.  
 The behavioral boundary correlates to the data security layer that deals 






Figure 4.   IA Boundary vs. Defense in Depth 
To compare this to something familiar in a submarine context, information 
assurance boundaries can be viewed similar to the submarine safety (SUBSAFE) 
program, which also contains a multilayered Quality Assurance (QA) process. 
Understanding these boundaries could also help identify with and understand the End-to-
End Security concept. Due to the specific nature of the SUBSAFE program, a detailed 
description of the SUBSAFE program cannot be covered in this thesis. 
For someone involved in the submarine community, it is possible to observe that 
for the last 25 years, the use of computer systems in the submarine forward compartment 
(such as Fire Control, Sonar, Navigation Center, Radio, and Missile Control Center) has 
changed. Whereas in the past, the computer systems were used as tools by trained and 
experienced sailors to assist in making critical decisions, it is often the case now that 
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sailors are simply concurring with the decisions made by the computers, as the computers 
are the sources of information, and the sailors are lacking in the training and experience 
they once had.  
In submarine systems, the old architecture has been dramatically changed with the 
inclusion and increase of Commercial Off-the-Shelf equipment (COTS), in attempt to 
make our sailors “smarter” with the data that is given to them. In some areas operators 
and technicians have done that well with the extra equipment. But in other aspects we 
have not done well. The systems architecture of those systems has changed in attempt to 
improve how sailors operate and fight the ship. Ill planned operational requirements for 
new technology have changed and violated the Physical, Functional, and Behavioral IA 
boundaries of our systems. Older systems on submarines may not be IA compliant, with 
respect to current DoD IA compliance regulations or as compared to newer hardware and 
software builds. In this case, the best apparent mitigation is for the local submarine 
squadron to promulgate guidance for their afloat units for marking, handling, and 
safeguarding classified data processing systems. 
B. PHYSICAL IA BOUNDARY 
The physical IA boundary, closely related to IA system security (availability and 
integrity) can be considered the same as Layer One of the Defense-in-Depth model, being 
the physical controls preventing access to IT equipment that would further allow 
someone access to any electronic information system. The typical example given is a 
secure building with multilayer physical access controls in place such as a sensitive 
server data farm located in the most inner room with a locked door and alarm system 
which is also secured by the outer door to the building with a locked door and alarm 
system. Access to that sensitive server or data farm would also be limited to a minimum 
number of personnel. Addressing information security (authenticity and confidentiality), 
a common access card is a good example of the use of this boundary. Without the card, 
you have no access. 
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Physical security for submarine is like any typical naval ship. It is typically 
moored in a secure Naval installation, followed by a physical barrier system of some type 
before reaching another personnel access control barrier where sailors must verify access 
for any personnel entering the submarine.  
Once below deck, the physical IA boundaries can be somewhat nontraditional. 
Due to the physical architecture of various submarine platforms, it is not always practical 
to locate sensitive information systems in a fashion that allows the equipment to be 
physically locked in a secure space. But with respect to the server racks, or other 
equipment, they can have physical access controls in place. For example, on Trident class 
submarines, a Submarine Local Area Network (SUBLAN) server is installed in a space 
called the Data Processing Room due to the classification of the server and convenience 
(following a modernization period for that class of ship).  Otherwise, none of the 
unclassified Information Systems equipment, with the exception of a classified server, is 
designed to be locked. The Los Angeles class submarine platform is no different in 
comparison to the Trident class. The newer Virginia class submarine took into account 
the need to isolate and lock classified servers and designed that requirement into the 
original building plans. 
C. FUNCTIONAL IA BOUNDARY 
The functional IA boundary correlates to the host security, internal network, and 
perimeter security layers. Within the host security section of a typical Defense in Depth 
model, there is  
 patch management, also known as security update management, 
 intrusion prevention, also known as zero day attack protection,  
 virus protection (also known as antivirus updates) host-based firewall 
(also known as inbound TCP/IP port protocol) 
 server hardening (also known as operating system hardening)  
 authentication, and  
 auditing.  
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This boundary should be defined and viewed as any process within a system or 
subsystem that can or does exchange data with another system or subsystem between 
Layers 2 and 6 of the Defense-in-Depth model. In other words, if one Information System 
can or does exchange data with another Information System by design or not by design, 
then it will pass through an Information Assurance Functional Boundary. 
The purpose of this model as described is to “provide a conceptual and functional 
framework” that aids in the concept of IA boundaries as they relate to a specific layer the 
DiD model. Additionally, this reference model is not intended to be “an implementation 
specification” and therefore does not exist in a real-world example. Instead, it is meant to 
visually depict the author’s three IA boundaries in relation to a typical DiD model. 
D. BEHAVIORAL IA BOUNDARY 
This is one boundary that is the most difficult to identify and control. The 
behavioral boundary will correlate to the data security and application layer of the 
Defense-in-Depth model. This boundary has two identifiable areas of concern: 
applications and human interaction. Both are the first and last information security 
checkpoints. 
Applications, whether compared to the Defense-in-Depth model or the OSI 
model, may vary in IA controls or in the application’s own security vulnerabilities. Such 
application vulnerabilities include but are not limited to invalidated inputs, broken access 
controls, broken authentication and session, management, cross site scripting flaws, 
buffer overflows, injection flaws, improper error handling, insecure storage, denial of 
service, and insecure configuration management, and so on. Keeping vulnerabilities 
identified and patched is a daunting task. In some cases, it is not practical or not possible 
to fully fix some applications’ vulnerabilities due to the possibility of destroying the 
application’s availably to its designed functionality. For example, Microsoft Office 2010 
is the most integrated MSOffice package ever created. But, because of a wide breath of 
integrated interoperability, MSOffice has numerous security exploits contained within it.  
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The human IA boundary is the most difficult to control, regardless of the status of 
the physical and functional IA boundaries. Human interactions at the application layer 
can be similar from one person to the next, but a user’s reasoning for deciding to do the 
wrong thing with respect to violating IA controls or Information Security policy can vary 
greatly as much as the many creative ways to commit the violation. The user in this case 
is a user who is cleared for classified information, but this kind of user also has, in some 
cases, the ability to manipulate or even remove that information from the system or 
network. To put it simply, just because people can commit a security violation via an 
application on an information system does not mean  it will purposefully happen. The 
significant observation to be made is that the action of the user, not the reaction of the 
application of that classified system or network may be the source of the violation and 
not the software. 
E. IA BOUNDRIES ONBOARD 
The issue at hand is not necessarily with new systems installed on submarines, 
such as the Submarine Warfare Federal Tactical System (SWFTS), where the IA 
boundaries are significantly improved, or with the newer Virginia class platforms, where 
most of the systems have IA concepts designed into the architecture. The focus here is on 
older systems, such as the Block 1C Fire Control system, Submarine Tactical Display 
Auxiliary (STDA) system or the typical BYG-1 Fire Control system. These systems are 
not IA compliant with current IA policies due to their age; when these systems were 
designed or installed, IA was not considered.  
These systems have stood mostly alone for over a decade with a level of 
interoperability that could be expected for that time. Due to the sensitivity of classified 
material controls, advances in technology, attempts to make up for shortfalls in long term 
degradation of navigation, and combat system management, and lack of advanced 
navigation and voyage planning skills, additional standalone or peripheral systems 
continue to be installed on submarines to interface with older systems, without any 
consideration for IA compliance or concept of End-to-End security practices. The intent 
of these additional systems was to improve capability. Instead, these additional peripheral 
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systems changed the overall system of systems architecture, thus breaking down the 
aforementioned IA boundaries, resulting in overall system performance and false sense of 
reliability, specifically with the submarine combat systems.  
Further research is recommended both on this cause and effect of new 
Information Systems as disruptive technology to older Information systems on board 
ships and submarines and if ability to safely operate, navigate, and fight the ship has 
improved with the addition of these new systems. Further research is also recommended 
to capture reliability data to provide sufficient context to provide an effective standard of 
evaluation of in-use combat system software and hardware build. 
The Fleet is currently challenged in their ability to understand how their combat 
systems are performing. How much effort should be required to maintain a system 
performing to design specifications?  What amount of sluggishness, or other system 
problems, is indicative that action needs to be taken?   
F. SUMMARY 
The concept of IA boundaries as it relates to the DiD model and OSI model is 
relatively new suggestion. With a basic understanding of those models and IA, a direct 
correlation can be observed. With a basic understanding of IA and the operation of those 
systems that this research addresses, the concept of IA boundaries can be understood by 
operators, technicians, PMs, and leadership. IT operators and technicians are among the 
highest priority to understand this concept and manage all of the IA requirements 
management. But it will require new personnel, training, and leadership: a new human 
capital strategy. How will the submarine force build these enlisted ranks with the proper 
Navy Enlisted Education Code (NEC) and training while managing the overall manpower 








VII. HUMAN CAPITAL STRATEGY 
A. MANNING 
“The establishment of the ITS rating will provide the Submarine Force with an 
infrastructure of information assurance and network professionals who will be fully 
equipped to resolve future issues and implement new technologies on board our 
submarines” (Public Affairs, United States Navy 2010). But the new rate has not gone as 
well as planned. This is the first time the submarine force has created a new enlisted 
technical designator, or rate, of this kind. Unlike a civilian corporation, the submarine 
force cannot hire off the streets to fill a need at the E5/E6 level, so they have to find those 
Sailors who are ready to shift over from their previous technical rate and get them into 
these billets, while at the same time populate the accession side for future stability. 
Therefore, a new rate, was required to meet the demand of the submarine networks.  
Submarine ITS manning projections continue to show improvement as the 
submarine force is manned with the earliest A-school graduations reporting in spring 
2013. As inventory grows, commanding officers are encouraged to fill their ITS shortfalls 
from within their crew by submitting an updated ITS division stabilization message, as 
described below, to Navy Personnel Command Code 403 (PERS-403). PERS-403 will 
assign these selected Sailors to vacant ITS billets and backfill their respective divisions 
appropriately. The bottom line on this issue is that the submarine force is building the ITS 
community from both accessions and divisional cross-decks sailors on board; it does not 
come without challenges. 
B. ITS NEC CONVERSION 
The difference between direct and lateral conversion is that direct conversion does 
not require a formal school as part of the training path, whereas a lateral conversion is via 
a formal school. When the ITS rate was started, Commander Naval Cyber Forces 
(COMNAVCYBERFOR) mandated that all IT or ITS rated sailors who hold Navy 
Education Code (NEC) 2735 and do not hold NECs 2779, 2780, or 2781, are required to 
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do a direct conversion to their NEC through Delta training, described in several Naval 
Administration (NAVADMIN) messages released in 2011. On Dec 31, 2012 all 2735 
(older) NECs were being phased out and converted to NEC 0000 and those affected 
sailors could be limited in permanent Change of Station (PCS) assignments, Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) eligibility, and they could receive unfavorable Perform to 
Serve (PTS) results. Sailors with Naval Education Codes (NEC) 2779, 2780, or 2781 
(older LAN NECs) have the option to directly convert their NEC, but are not required to 
do so; however, these sailors may also suffer the same impacts as the mandatory direct 
converted sailors and are therefore highly encouraged to convert their NEC directly as 
well. Some of the sailors who hold these older NECs originate from the Journeyman 
Network Core (JNET-Core)-NEC 2735, Network Security Vulnerability Technician 
(NSVT) NEC 2780, Advance Network Analysis-NEC 2781, and Information Assurance 
Manager-NEC 2779 schools. To track the progress throughout the fleet, a report is sent 
by Navy Cyber Forces Command to all the Type Commanders (TYCOMs) each month, 
showing the percent completion rates for each TYCOM; Commander Submarine Pacific 
COMSUBPAC AOR is currently about 80% or better complete with the 2791 NEC 
requirements. By January 2013, Commander Submarine Atlantic (COMSUBLANT) 
maintains administrative control of the conversion, stop tracking NEC conversion due to 
the significant progress made. But, as of February 2013, “Current ITS inventory is 
approximately 50% of the force requirement” (COMSUBLANT 2013). 
1. Training 
One of the requirements to complete the 2791 NEC direct conversion is to have 
Security Plus certification and NEC 2735. This is the most difficult requirement to 
complete because the sailor either has to study and schedule his own exam or wait for the 
local submarine squadron to contract an outside training and testing organization. NEC 
2790 requires a self-taught IT differences training called “Skills Port” and A-Plus 
certification.  
To help increase the completion rate, one week boot camp style training sessions 
are being utilized in order to complete the Security Plus certification component of the 
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direct conversion. The remaining requirements can be completed using Skills Port 
training, which has been delivered to all submarines via a Skill Soft CD and is also 
available online. Another method to complete security plus training via standalone 
software called Carnegie Mellon Virtual Training Environment (VTE) provided by 
TYCOM. 
It is difficult for sailors to complete their courses, due to ships’ Operational 
Tempo (OPTEMPO) and daily workload. Additionally, the biggest challenge for sailors 
to complete these courses is the limited availability and access to computers on board. 
There are approximately 6 to 10 public unclassified workstations available for the entire 
crew onboard submarines. These workstations are typically shared with divisions for 
work purposes. Submarine Information Technicians have to compete for computer usage 
and are constantly getting bumped off for higher priority usage of those computers. The 
training products on board are self-paced and are for self-study and require time and a 
space for the laptop for the sailors to be able to complete them. Sailors cannot ask 
questions if they do not understand something, so it is strictly one-way training. The 
courses are also bandwidth intensive and do not function well using limited peer 
connectivity and certainly are not available underway. Despite each ship being given 
training on DVD to overcome the bandwidth problem, submarines are not the best 
learning environment for Computer Based Training (CBT), as there are limited space and 
computer resources.  
With the constant workload associated management of the networks and 
Preventive Maintenance System (PMS), it may take several more months for people to 
complete the courses on board than would be the case if these courses were taken ashore. 
While information is available for the sailor to complete it, it is sometimes difficult to be 
technically ready to take the test for certification. To assist sailors in passing the 
certification exams, “boot camp” style week long courses are arranged by local 
submarine squadrons. These boot camps take sailors off the boat and immerse them into 
the material for one week. The key to success is not only focused time away from the 
workplace and the ship, but also the night study  sailors must perform to ensure they 
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understand the material. Sailors who take the exam immediately after the boot camp 
course tend to pass the first time, as opposed to the sailor who waits too long after the 
boot camp course to take the exam or tries to self-study for weeks or months. The 
Achilles’ heel to these boot camp courses is lack of centralized coordination and 
scheduling. It is left up to the submarines and submarine squadrons to find reliable and 
qualified vendors to provide the training and certification exams. This is a very inefficient 
way to train and certify new submarine rate that is in charge of a virtual combat 
communications system. The submarine force’s training and readiness department at the 
TYCOM level is a much more efficient vehicle and is better suited to coordinate onboard 
training for the submarine Information Technician.  
Currently, there is no way for a ship’s Executive Officer of a submarine to 
schedule his Information Technician to go to school for Security Plus training in advance 
of approximately 30 days. If the TYCOM Training Readiness Department coordinated all 
aspects of the boot camp schools, afloat commands could actually plan ahead for sailors 
to attend training to complete their Security Plus Certification. 
The current ITS NEC breakout for SSBN submarines, for example, is two 2791 
(E4-E7) and two 2790 (E1-E5) ITS school graduates), so the senior enlisted pay grades 
still have to come from the boat. PERS-403 continues to work closely with the enlisted 
community manager (ECM) as this rating is established. The A-school pipeline is 
expected to start producing graduates in 2013. Until that time, there is a lack of 
distributable ITS inventory to fully staff every ITS division. It will be necessary for 
commands to continue to backfill their divisions from onboard personnel. Replacements 
will be identified form a source rating of onboard crewmembers. 
C. ITS MANPOWER 
In order to track and report this process, PERS-403 has been (for almost two 
years) directing afloat commands to submit LAN stabilization messages (Figure 5) 
whereby PERS-403 would review with the appropriate detailers and respond by message 
(Figure 6) with concurrence or non-concurrence for sailors to convert to the new ITS rate. 
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In order to grant concurrence, the sailor’s detailer and community manager must be able 
to support losing that sailor from their current manpower inventory. A common and 
critical error made by the afloat Command is reassigning a sailor to the ships IT division 
and allowing that sailor to work for months, sometimes up to a year and a half before 
submitting a direct rate conversion package. The request is sometimes disapproved due to 
the sailor’s parent rate being undermanned. The parent rate is the sailors first enlisted rate 
before converting to a new designator. The result is a sailor who has not functioned in his 
original contracted rate for an extended period of time is still required to take 
advancement exams from his parent rate for which he is no longer proficient. 
Additionally, that sailor sometimes gets reassigned back to his old rate due to not being 
able to convert to the new ITS rate. Prior to deployment, a submarine may transmit a 
LAN division manning message (Figure 6) showing the complete makeup of the division. 
The task of NEC managing has been placed on the afloat Command. The burden 
should reside between the TYCOM and local submarine squadron. The submarine 
squadron was omitted from the process of screening IT direct rate conversion packages. 
This omission resulted in many conversion requests being denied that should have been 
approved, and many that were approved that should have been denied. In other words, 
quality assurance checks at the squadron level may have improved the selection process. 
For a more accurate manning picture, the ship would send a message similar to Figure 7 
“While previous practice was to set Navy Manning Plan (NMP) (distributable 
inventory) equal to Billets Authorized (BA) (funded requirement) during creation of the 
ITS rating, at the most recent NMP working group, the decision was made to set NMP to 
actual projected inventory to correctly shape expectations force-wide”  (COMSUBLANT 
2013). This decision was in response to continuous unfavorable feedback from afloat 
commanding officers to the submarine administrative officer corps about not being 
properly manned with ITS sailors. Subsequently, the NMP was lowered in attempt to 
give the perception that the ships are or will be officially manned by meeting the NEC 
requirement held on board, regardless of the sailor’s billet. “Over accession in two other 
ratings (FT and ET-NAV) produced distributable inventory that allows setting NMP 
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higher than BA (+1 or +2) for each rate for each crew. These sailors in excess of 
requirements should provide sufficient capacity to continue manning LAN divisions until 
the ITS pipeline steady state capacity can produce adequate distributable inventory (NMP 
at least 85% of BA)” (COMSUBLANT 2013). Other than the analysis previously 
described, the error made here is the impression of no longer requiring higher throughput 
for the new ITSs A-school due to an unanalyzed assumption that the submarines can, will 
or should be managing the ITS manning, manpower, and NEC conversions properly; it 
simply is not their duty to do so. 
 









Figure 7.   Complete LAN Manning Message 
D. ADDITIONAL ITS CONVERSION OPPORTUNITIES 
In early February 2013, COMSUBLANT sent a message to the submarine force 
stating, “A recent increase in capacity at the A and C-schools creates the opportunities to 
open up lateral conversion opportunities for submarine qualified sailors” 
(COMSUBLANT 2013). What this message means is that  the submarine force 
previously denied lateral conversions to the ITS rating for sailors without an IT 
background due to insufficient student quotas for the necessary training to level the 
playing field for converted ITS sailors. The reason there is an increase in capacity in the 
A-school is due to lowering the NMP as stated above. “Submarine warfare qualified 
sailors who do not have the required 2790 or 2791 NEC may apply for lateral conversion 
and, upon approval, be written PCS orders to A-school and C-school to obtain the 
requisite NECs” (Update on the status of the ITS community and conversion 
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opportunities” 2013). In other words, a sailor who wants to be an ITS does not have to do 
any of the onboard training but can wait to be converted via formal training.  
The personnel who are responsible for Command and Control on many afloat 
units are not sensitive to or completely aware of the IA requirements management, PMS, 
daily operation, reporting requirements, security requirements, and the process required 
to train and convert old outdated IT NECs to a current more relevant 2791 NEC.  
In this confusing roadmap, the Submarine Force has allowed three different paths 
for sailors desiring to convert to the ITS rating. First, a submarine qualified sailor who 
does not have the required 2790 or 2791 NEC may apply for lateral conversion and, upon 
approval, will be ordered to official IT school. Second, submarine warfare qualified 
sailors who obtain the 2790 NEC utilizing onboard training may be ordered to school to 
obtain the 2791 NEC and subsequently converted to the ITS and returned to sea duty. 
Third, sailors may obtain the 2791 NEC by completing onboard and civilian training and 
certifications or equivalent to that received in the official IT school. Upon completion of 
that training, sailors must submit a request to be awarded the 2791 NEC. Each of these 
methods, aggregated together, do not come without consequences. In conversion request, 
commanding officers should be very clear on when they would be willing to allow the 
sailor to separate from a command with the understanding that any replacement personnel 
may take 6 to 9 months to fill that billet. Also, if the sailor is selected for conversion and 
the command is unable to support temporarily losing the sailor during his seat tour to 
attend official IT school, the sailor in question should be able to attend that school upon 
normal detachment from sea to shore duty. 
E. RESOURCES VS. TRAINING 
Some properly trained non-Navy IT professionals might find a submarine network 
very rudimentary. Training and equipment are fundamental assets to the Submarine Local 
Area Network. Without either, the SUBLAN would come to a standstill. On-the-job 
training has become the primary method for sailors to learn how to maintain the 
SUBLAN. Most of the problems seen in the fleet are not replicated in the training lab. 
Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes give a baseline, but not enough to meet the 
demands of a SUBLAN Administrator. Currently, Journeyman Network (JNET), 
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Network Systems Vulnerability Technician (NSVT) and Advanced Network Analyst 
(ANA) schools are all approximately six weeks long and come with NECs, 2735, 2780 
and 2781, respectively. Some components of the SUBLAN, such as NIAPS, Global 
Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) and Non Tactical Data Processing 
Subsystem (NTDPS) are not covered by formal training. Some of the SUBLAN Onboard 
administrators indicate that six weeks is not enough time to learn the many aspects of the 
SUBLAN. Hardware and software care are covered by the Preventive Maintenance 
System (PMS). Following the PMS guidance and SUBLAN set up configuration, and 
accomplished per the PMS, ensures that virus and firewall protection are in place. 
Switches and servers are rebooted from time to time as needed to maintain sustainability 
of the network. A new ITSs A-School was brought on line in 2013. Further research is 
recommended for the new ITSs A-school effectiveness to meet fleet needs. 
F. SUMMARY 
When reviewing this problem, it is possible to observe that there are two 
significant, but unofficial, types of submarine Information Technicians. The first type is 
the Information Technician who has been fully converted with the 2791 NEC, filling the 
Information Technician billet in accordance with the LAN stabilization message, but is 
being leveraged to work outside the LAN division supporting that sailor’s division and 
rate; the LAN is treated as a secondary and collateral duty.  
The second type of Information Technician is that sailor who is working in the 
Information Technician division either as a part-time collateral duty or full-time, but who 
is not a fully converted information technician. This is clearly poor personnel 
management, due to observations previously mentioned above and misplaced 
contributions by sailors being tooled and used for one job, yet being tested and advanced 
in rate in which they have not functioned  for an extended period of time. The author of 
this thesis can only observe this is a lack of sensitivity to a core group of sailors forced to 
take care of the ship’s network; what once was considered a collateral duty has become a 
full-time job. However, this task is still treated as though it is a collateral duty. Needs, 
requirements, and functions must synchronize. 
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VIII. IA REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
The submarine force lacks the ability to comprehensively manage Information 
Assurance (IA) and associated security requirements promulgated by operational and 
administrative authorities through TYCOMS, ISICS and to/from subordinate afloat 
commands. Current IA requirements management solutions and related training are not 
available. Historically, IA related policies, directives, instructions and related guidance 
documents reflect what is required; however, they do not provide sufficient detail as to 
how to satisfy and manage requirements relevant at the tactical level. 
Afloat commands are required to maintain and manage IA and related documents 
specific to the systems installed aboard their respective commands, primarily the System 
Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) and Authority to Operate (ATOs). The 
SSAAs contain system specific technical, administrative and physical IA requirements 
and must be maintained, reflecting system changes specific to the afloat command. 
Systems ATOs are typically issued for a period of three years and afloat commands need 
to manage these documents to ensure they remain current and valid. Afloat commands 
are also required to maintain and manage IA and related compliance requirements to 
include Information Assurance Vulnerability Alerts (IAVA), Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) and Communications Tasking Orders (CTO). 
The DoD 8570.01-M Directive is the Information Assurance Workforce 
Improvement Program. The 8570.01-M directs that all Information Assurance Workforce 
personnel must become compliant with the mandated IT and Security certification 
standards; this also includes the enlisted ITS Sailors. There are various levels of 
compliance based on the position of the personnel in the IT/IA workforce. The most 
common certifications included A+, Network+, Security+, Certified Ethical Hacking 




Although compliance and management of IA requirements at afloat/tactical 
command levels are generally administrative in nature, the lack of effective management 
of either could indirectly affect an elevated threat to data, systems, networks, and makes 
it necessary for a significant numbers of man hours to be used to address related issues in 
the tactical submarine environment. There continues to be no one source for any 
submarine afloat command to manage IA requirements. In addition, online accounts 
designed for the IT workforce appear to grow over time. 
There are a myriad of required on line accounts for the ship’s Information 
Assurance Manager (IAM) and System Administrator (SA), to include but not limited to: 
 Online Compliance Reporting system (OCRS) https://www.iava.navy.mil  
 Naval Networks https://navalnetworks.spawar.navy.mil 
 COMPACFLT SEAT1 https://cpf2.nmci.nacy.mil/rita/desktopdefault.aspx  
 Navy Information Security https://infosec.navy.mil  and 
https://infosec.navy.smil.mil 
 Total Workforce Management Services (TWIMS) 
https://twms.nmci.navy.mil 
 Skill Port Navy https://navyiacertprep.skillport.com 
 VRAM 2.0 https://vram.spawar.navy.mil 
 Navy IA Portal VRAM 1.0 https://www.iaportal.fnmoc.navy.smil.mil 
 Sailor 2.1 https://sailor.nmci.navy.mil and 
https://sailor.spawar.navy.smil.mil 
The source for this sample of required accounts is derived from various 
promulgations by TYCOM and 10 th Fleet.
 
B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE IN SUBMARINES AND THE OFFICER 
CORPS   
Both current junior enlisted and junior officer ranks are in need of assistance that 
they need understandable policy that governs IT/IA manning and equipment. IA 
awareness is increasing, but not at the right operational or administrative level. There 
remains a significant level of knowledge gap between Echelon 2 and 3 in the overall 
understanding, implementation, and management of IA. This level of knowledge gap is 
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most profound at the Command and Control executive level. The Immediate Superior in 
Command (ISIC) is the afloat unit’s squadron major commander. At no fault of their 
own, most Major Commanders and their senior deputies still do not fully understand IT 
or IA requirements management. Unfortunately, current executive level senior submarine 
officers do not view IT/IA knowledge as a core competency, or as an important 
inspection-worthy attribute; they simply do not have the time to understand how IA as a 
system affects currently installed systems.  
1. Generation Gap 
Until the generation gap between senior and junior afloat officers is closed or 
there is a significant setback, such as breach of information security, and/or direction 
from higher authority, this lack of sensitivity is not expected to show improvement. The 
junior officers in the wardroom are a product of society where technology, networking, 
and information system security have advanced together. It may take another five to ten 
years for current junior officer department heads, who grew up on technology and are 
more sensitive and receptive to the importance of information systems, to be promoted 
the executive officer and commanding officer’s level and effect change. In the meantime, 
current senior leadership continues to view and utilize IT/IA function as a collateral duty. 
The enlisted technical experts are more receptive to the importance of information 
systems as a valuable core competency for submariners.  
The current submarine communications division officer, normally a first tour 
Ensign or Lieutenant Junior Grade Officer, and the ship’s navigation officer, is charged 
with and responsible for oversight of IT/IA/LAN onboard the submarine itself. 
Submarine squadron communications officers who are previously enlisted (8 years or 
longer) Limited Duty Officers (LDO) are the best equipped to take on this new burden. 
Their experience, wisdom, and technical ability allow them to adapt to dynamic changes 
in their profession. Senior leadership, as mentioned above, must support the 
communication LDO leadership and what they bring into a complex and new systems of 
systems for the submarine force. Submarine squadron communications officers are 
  
48 
adapting to this new IT/IA/LAN workload—but it is not fast enough and they do not have 
enough support. 
In fairness, senior leadership, to include second tour department heads on board 
the submarine are simply overloaded with day-to-day functions and/or simply  do not 
have the resources to expend on a new (now full time) technical rate. The current IT 
chain of command on a typical submarine starts with the junior technician, senior 
technician, Information Assurance Officer (IAO), Information Assurance Manager 
(IAM), XO, and CO. Due to manpower shortfalls and onboard manning mismanagement, 
most submarines, the technicians and the IAM is the same person. The submarines’ 
navigation officer is the IAM. Relief must be sought to shore up and strengthen the IA 
boundaries, so as to maintain and “fight the virtual ship.”  Current system designs, 
manning, policy, and a lack of interoperability burdens the sailor and requires the 
onboard command and control element to compensate as best as possible. 
C. FUTURE IT OFFICER 
Over the last few years, IA and the critical importance of networking have been 
recognized by every level in the chain of command. Submarine Communications Limited 
Duty Officers (Sub LDOs) with the designation 6290 are expected to be experts in 
networking and IA in addition to the more traditional C4I areas. 6290 LDOs are finding 
themselves at a significant disadvantage in that almost all of them arrive at their first 
billet with no networking and IA training and potentially dated C4I knowledge. 
Submarine Communications LDOs as IA workforce personnel are required to attain 
Information Assurance Workforce (IAWF) Level 1 certification (Grimes, 2012, 25). In 
order to save money, the submarine force does not route new or current 6290 LDOs to 
any official training to meet DoD 8570.01-M requirements. Currently, those LDOs are 
expected to obtain Level 1training and certification via their own professional or personal 
resources. In order to fully support their assigned command and facilitate completion of 
IAWF level 1, all 6290 LDOs should attend a networking school and IA Manager school 
prior to reporting to their first officer billet. The Information Dominance Warfare Officer 
(IDWO) community maintains a training path system for their Information Professionals 
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(IP) 1820 officers. The submarine force continues to lag behind the forward leaning 10th 
Fleet and IP community by not properly training and integrating the 6290 LDOs into the 
IDWO IP 1820 community.  
Current 6290 LDOs versus future 6290 does not match up to fleet support. 
Current 6290 LDOs are prior enlisted submarine radio Chief Petty Officers or First Class 
Petty Officers and are commissioned between eight and 15 years of service. Most of the 
6290 LDOs do not have an IT background, unless they learned it on their own, attended 
official training, or on the rare occasion, were commissioned from an enlisted source rate 
that maintained the submarine network as a collateral duty. The drawback to the latter is 
that the officer does not have a traditional communications experience. The benefit to the 
latter is that officer is actually better equipped to support submarine communications in 
its current and future IP based network configuration. It is uncertain where future 
generations of 6290 LDOs should originate. If the submarine force continues not to 
integrate with IP 1820 community, or send newly commissioned 6290 LDO officers for 
official IT/IA training, suitable manpower relief will have to originate from the new ITS 
rate. This may become problematic because there are no submarine IP/IT/IA officers.  
When a new ITS Chief who has no experience with traditional submarine 
communications but was a prior Sonar Technician (ST), Fire Control Technician (FT), or 
Navigational Electronics Technician (NAVET), desires to submit a commissioning 
package for 6290 LDO, it is currently unknown how the officer selection board will view 
the Sailor’s contribution to the 6290 LDO community. With no experience in traditional 
submarine communications, it is doubtful that the Sailor will be selected for 6290 LDO. 
The submarine force must have a plan for new officers commissioning from the new 
submarine ITS rate. The current LDO recruiting brief does not address the ITS rate as a 
future officer source.  
Feasible solutions requiring further research: 
  Assign communications 6290 LDOs to at sea submarine duty as junior 
officers. This will put the submarine force back on track and further lay a 
proper foundation for solid cyber security in the future.  
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 Combine the submarine communications division and ITS division and 
send new communications ETs to more IT schools. Communications ETs 
are already receiving some IT training at A-school. Currently, TYCOM 
senior communications department heads are reluctant to tackle such a 
significant task.  
 Create a submarine IT Chief Warrant Officer (CWO). The submarine 
force is no longer producing submarine electronics CWOs due to 
obsolesce of that particular Officer designator. The vitality of a submarine 
IT CWO could be a cost effective option for an IA/IT manager for ISIC 
and some afloat platforms. 
 Establish a new IA/Security subject requirements manager position at the 
ISIC or Group Commander level. This position can be filled by a 6290 
LDO or civilian equivalent. This new position would: 
o Initiate related tiered training at the ISIC level to train and 
transition a management solution to ISIC staff and subordinate 
afloat units 
o Review current IA requirements and status of related 
documentation at the afloat command level to establish a status 
baseline among subordinate afloat units 
o Establish a liaison with DoD / DoN level authorities at ISIC level 
D. IA REQUIREMENTS MANAGER 
The proposed IA requirements manager solution approach is intended to 
incorporate detailed/system TYCOM, ISIC and afloat command specific information of 
GENSER and DoDIIS IA requirements, providing a Secure Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNET) based single point of reference facilitating visibility and proactive 
management of all IA requirements at all levels of submarine force command. The 
current IA management architecture is disjointed and does not follow a proper 
administrative chain of command. The proposed IA management architecture (Figure 8) 
is more appropriate and will incorporate detailed systematic TYCOM, ISIC and afloat 
command specific information of GENSER and DoD Intelligent Information System 
(DoDIIS) IA requirements, providing a SIPRNET based single point of reference, 
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facilitating visibility and proactive management of all IA requirements at all levels of 
submarine force command. 
In addition, the Department of Defense (DoD) Intelligence Information Systems 
(DoDIIS) is the authoritative technical and management architecture for management of 
all systems processing Top Secret-Special Compartment Information (TS-SCI) 
information. 
 























Figure 8.   IA Management Architecture 
E. SUMMARY 
IA requirements levied across the DoD and related domains continue to evolve, 
increasing in number and complexity. The impact of this at the afloat/tactical command 
level culminates in a significant impact in the ability to effectively manage these 
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requirements. Without a management solution, coupled with the limited ability to obtain 
and maintain the requisite IA and related skill sets at this level, what is created is an 
increased threat to data, systems, networks, significant expenditure of associated 
resources/man hours and overall mission capability. The submarine force already 
maintains an experienced officer corps that requires additional IT/IA training. In order to 
support to the full potential of the intent of DUSW, the return of the submarine Warrant 
Officer directly commissioned from the ITS rate will pay priceless dividends for the 
submarine force.  
The proposed IA requirements manager (officer or civilian) solution approach is 
intended to incorporate detailed/system TYCOM, ISIC and afloat command specific 
information of GENSER and DoDIIS IA requirements, providing a Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) based single point of reference facilitating training, visibility, and proactive 
management of all IA requirements at all levels of submarine TYCOM, ISIC and afloat 
command level. General Service (GENSER) requirements are applicable to systems 
processing for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET, and Special Compartment 
Information (SCI) level information. An additional, commonly overlooked, duty of an IA 
requirements manager should be establishing and maintaining an administrative risk 
assessment program for the submarine networks. Even a basic qualitative risk assessment 
process for the Commanding Officer and ITS division would provide understandable 
mitigations for network vulnerabilities.  
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IX. RISK ASSESSMENT 
A. BACKGROUND 
Risk assessment is a phrase that is often used in the submarine force and is equally 
misunderstood. Risk, as lectured during a Naval Postgraduate School risk management 
lecture, is the potential of losses and rewards resulting from an exposure to a hazard or as 
a result of a risk event. “Risk management is the act or practice of dealing with risk. It is 
a process used to plan for risk, assess (identify and analyze) risk areas, develop risk 
handling options, monitoring risks to determine how they have changed and documenting 
the overall risk program” (Department of Defense Risk Management Guide, 2006, 7). In 
other words, risk assessment should be managing what can go wrong, determining how 
likely is it to go wrong, and deciding what happens if it does go wrong. As another 
definition of risk puts it this way: “Risk is a function of the likelihood of a threat event’s 
occurrence and potential adverse impact should the event occur” (Guide for Conducting 
Risk Assessments 800–30 Rev1,  2012, 12). “The purpose of risk assessments is to 
inform decision makers and support risk responses by identifying: relevant threats to 
organizations or threats directed through organizations against other organizations; 
vulnerabilities both internal and external to organizations; impact (i.e., harm) to 
organizations that may occur given the potential for threats exploiting vulnerabilities; and 
likelihood that harm will occur” (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, ix). For submarine IT 
managers, “Risk assessments are a key part of effective risk management and facilitate 
decision making at all three tiers in the risk management hierarchy including the 
organization level, mission/business process level, and information system level” (NIST 
800–30 Rev1, ix). In this context, the mission/business is the protection and strengthens 
Information Assurance on submarine networks.  
B. INFORMATION ASSURANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800–37 is a “guide for 
applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems” (NIST 800–
37 2010, 2). The DoD Risk Management Guide for Acquisition’s purpose is to “assist 
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DoD and contractor Program Managers (PMs), program offices and Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs) in effectively managing program risks during the entire acquisition process, 
including sustainment” (DoD RMG 2006, i). At the Navy level, there is the Navy 
Information Assurance (IA) Program OPNAV 5239.1C, the Navy IA program instruction 
that establishes policies and procedures for the Navy’s Information Assurance (IA) 
program. OPNAVINST 5239.1C does not contain any risk management guidance at the 
TYCOM level or below. Anything further down towards the TYCOM level and afloat 
unit, and there continues to be no risk IA Risk Management (IARM) program in place. A 
thesis by Lambert was published in 2002 on Information Risk Management (IARM) , and 
in it, he attempted to establish “a method to standardize the Department of the Navy 
(DoN) human factors involvement in information assurance Navy-wide,  (2)  and 
determine if it necessary for a specific IARM course and at what level” (Labert 2002, V)  
In particular, Lambert’s research asked, “at what level would an IARM course be 
appropriate:  an afloat unit?  Squadron?  Group? or TYCOM?” (Labert 2002, V) 
Lambert conclusions suggest that a TYCOM, in partnership with a SUBLAN 
Program Manager, establish a simplified operational level risk assessment training 
program for each submarine to analyze the ship’s overall network vulnerabilities. This 
risk management program would measure the impact on the ship due to the loss of part or 
all of functionality by determining the probability and identification of controls and 
safeguards that can reduce the operational risk to an acceptable level. Before any risk 
training program or risk application can be used onboard, a basic understanding of the 
two basic types of risk analysis should be considered: qualitative and quantitative. A 
qualitative risk analysis assessment may be the better then a quantitative analysis at the 
afloat level, due to the qualitative risk assessments conducted by onboard subject matter 
expert, whose experienced opinions and collective judgment makes it possible to evaluate 
the probability, consequence or severity, and likelihood values.  
C. UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS 
To support a risk assessment, a risk analysis is necessary to determine the inherent 
risks, including both the internal and external environments in addition to the Information 
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Systems (IS) risks onboard. Submarine network security can be threatened by various 
agents with a variety of means. IT management is charged with showing that due 
diligence is performed during the decision-making processes regarding the effect on 
ships’ network with respect to the level of risk mitigated, identification of threats, and the 
impact of a threat. A formal risk analysis provides the documentation that due diligence 
has been performed. An independent assessment from the submarines ISIC can offer an 
assessment of how their ships are performing. Unfortunately, there is no effective risk 
analysis available for submarine ITS personnel and command and control leadership to 
utilize in order to ascertain and define an acceptable level of risk for any submarine 
network not in compliance with any internal or external assessment performed.  
Risk analysis should provide three main deliverables:  
 identification of threats,  
 determination of the probability and impact of a threat, and  
 identification of controls and safeguards that can reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level. Each of these risk areas can be analyzed at the qualitative 
or quantitative level. 
D. UNDERSTANDING RISK ANALYSIS AND CYBER-1 
The closest attempt is in COMSUBFOR Cyber-1. CYBER-1 prescribes the 
minimum policies for network readiness and IA of Submarine Force networks. CYBER-1 
refers to a risk assessment but utilizes a simple yes or no compliance checklist 
(COMSUBFOR 2011, 87). A simple yes or no compliance checklist cannot provide an 
effective quantitative risk analysis to analyze the ship’s overall network vulnerabilities to 
measure the impact on the ship due to the loss of part or all of functionality. The current 
version of Annex A of CYBER-1 assessment checklists could be utilized to create a basic 
risk assessment if the DoD Risk Management Guide (Department of Defense RMG, 
2006) and (NIST) 800–30 Rev1 (NIST 800–30 Rev1, 2012) are used as a basic starting 
point. The current Annex A of CYBER-1 is more administrative in nature and less 
technical in nature. No specific risk assessment checklist is included.  
Annex A to CYBER-1 contains the following TABs for self-assessments: 
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 TAB A—Administration Checklist 
 TAB B—Manpower Checklist 
 TAB C—General Information Assurance Checklist 
 TAB D—Network Configuration Checklist 
 TAB E—Network Operations and Behavior Checklist 
 TAB F—Physical Security Checklist (this TAB is not directly associated 
with network security and is also covered in the Department of the Navy 
security manual 5510.36) 
 TAB G—Maintainability Checklist 
(COMSUBFOR 2011, 87) 
E. QUALITATIVE APPROACH 
1. Likelihood 
“The likelihood of occurrence is a weighted risk factor based on an analysis of the 
probability that a given threat is capable of exploiting a given vulnerability (or set of 
vulnerabilities)” (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, 10). CYBER-1 or any other documentation 
researched does not support any weighted risk factors to be included in any analysis.  
To derive an overall likelihood weighting that indicates the probability that a 
potential vulnerability may be executed within the associated threat environment, the 
following governing factors should be considered: 
 Threat source, motivation and capability 
 Nature of the vulnerability 
 Existence and effectiveness of current controls.  
Further research is recommended to identify specific “taxonomy of threat sources 
capable of imitating threat events”  (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, D-1) onboard submarines. 
In addition to the three items above, for submarine networks, the following should 
also be considered. Are the networks 
 Currently connected shore side 
 Currently at sea 
 IAVA compliant 
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 Virus definitions compliant 
It matters if a submarine is at sea or connected at the pier. Due to the nature of 
submarine connectivity while at sea, the biggest threat a submarine is concerned with is 
system administrator error, equipment fault, or an insider threat. In port, the submarine 
has to deal with all of the previously listed threats, with the addition of being connected 
to the Global Information Grid (GIG).  
The likelihood that a potential vulnerability can be described as ranges from very 
low to very high, as shown in Table 1. After likelihood level is assigned to each checklist 
line item, a basic risk red, yellow and green stoplight chart could then be utilized, 
formalized and used for executive review. From here, the afloat command could generate 
their own basic risk management plan. 
Table 1.   Assessment Scale–Likelihood of Threat Event Occurrence  





Values  Description—Root cause 
Very High 9–10 Error, accident, or act of nature is almost certain to 
occur; or occurs more than 100 times a year. 
High 7–8 Error, accident, or act of nature is highly likely to 
occur; or occurs between 10–100 times a year. 
Moderate 5–6 Error, accident, or act of nature is somewhat likely to 
occur; or occurs between 1–10 times a year. 
Low 3–4 Error, accident, or act of nature is unlikely to occur; or 
occurs less than once a year, but more than once 
every 10 years. 
Very Low 0–2 Error, accident, or act of nature is highly unlikely to 
occur; or occurs less than once every 10 years. 
 
2. Quantitative Approach 
For a quantitative measure more suitable of a standard format, a formal standard 
risk reporting matrix for evaluation and reporting of network vulnerabilities can used to 
determine the level of risks identified within each TAB of Appendix A in CYBER-1. 
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3. Severity and Consequence 
In order to set the stage and understanding of the severity or consequence, each 
line item from each TAB of the compliance checklists should be considered an event and 
weighted with a severity or consequence between 0 and 10, with 0 being lowest impact 
and 10 being the most significant undesirable impact of that event. The severity rating 
and description should be broken down in the following fashion from Table 2. 
Table 2.   Assessment Scale–Vulnerability Severity  





Values  Description—Root cause 
Very High 9–10 The vulnerability is exposed and exploitable, and its 
exploitation could result in severe impacts. 
Relevant security control or other remediation is not 
implemented and not planned; or no security measure can be 
identified to remediate the vulnerability. 
High 7–8 The vulnerability is of high concern, based on the exposure of 
the vulnerability and ease of exploitation and/or on the 
severity of impacts that could result from its exploitation. 
Relevant security control or other remediation is planned but 
not implemented; compensating controls are in place and at 
least minimally effective. 
Moderate 5–6 The vulnerability is of moderate concern, based on the 
exposure of the vulnerability and ease of exploitation and/or 
on the severity of impacts that could result from its 
exploitation. 
Relevant security control or other remediation is partially 
implemented and somewhat effective. 
Low 3–4 The vulnerability is of minor concern, but effectiveness of 
remediation could be improved. 
Relevant security control or other remediation is fully 
implemented and somewhat effective. 
Very Low 0–2 The vulnerability is not of concern. 
Relevant security control or other remediation is fully 
implemented, assessed, and effective. 
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4. Summing the Assessment 
After recording the numerical results from Tables 1 and 2, the level of likelihood 
of each root cause should be assessed using Table 3. For example, if the root cause was 
estimated to have a 70% probability of occurring, the corresponding likelihood will be 
assigned Level 4.  
Table 3.   Levels of Likelihood Criteria (From DoD RMG 2006) 
Level Likelihood Probability of Occurrence 
1 Not Likely ~10% 
2 Low Likelihood ~30% 
3 Likely ~50% 
4 Highly Likely ~70% 
5 Near Certainty ~90% 
 
The sum of the assessment of TAB A checklist can then be plotted in a format for 






















Figure 9.   Risk Assessment Block 
5. Impact 
In the context of this report, risk is any loss affecting the total IA trade space 
consisting of training, confidentiality, personnel, integrity, equipment, and availability. 
Since the impact on IA is the focus, the following is used to describe the submarine 
network’s loss in terms of the traditional integrity, availability, and confidentiality 
elements.  
6. Loss of Integrity 
System and data integrity refers to  “guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and 
authenticity” (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, B-7). Integrity is lost if intentional or accidental 
unauthorized changes are made to the network affecting the overall Information 
Assurance level. This could happen at the user or system administrator level.  
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7. Loss of Availability 
Availability is here defined as “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information” (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, B-2). If a mission-critical IT system is 
unavailable to its end users, the organization’s mission may be affected by the loss of 
system functionality and its operational effectiveness. Loss of availability does not affect 
all classes of submarines the same way. The difference between a SSBN- ballistic 
submarine and a SSN/SSGN attack submarine is its mission. Their specific use of 
SUBLAN is very similar but use of other tactical networks is significantly different. 
Those differences are beyond the scope of this report. 
8. Loss of Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is here defined as “preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information”  (NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, B-3). The Navy mitigates loss of 
classified, privacy, and proprietary information through the employment of various 
software systems and administrative Information Systems security programs that cover 
areas from physical to personnel. Discussions of these programs are not within the scope 
of this paper. 
F. THE TRAINING THREAT 
The first issue to tackle is the training piece. The level of knowledge across the 
board is not as strong as it should be to outwit and outlast the outsider and insider threats. 
The formal school and on-the-job training process is underfunded and lacks rigor and 
strength. Formal education is needed at the administrators’ and users’ level. Training is 
like a ship: if not taken care of, the ship may end up being not sea-worthy. Therefore, the 
quality of the training is important. 
G. THE EQUIPMENT THREAT 
Another potential threat is the obsolescence factor where hardware and software 
updates are in dire need. The SSBNs finally moved off of WIN 2K as an operating 
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system. The new operating system is Windows XP, which is already outdated when 
compared to civilian standards. Red Team Assessments on SUBLAN on various 
submarine platforms have been conducted. The analysis points similar findings as the 
ones discovered in this paper, i.e., at the acquisition program level, current SUBLAN 
hardware and software is obsolete. Have the assessments made a difference in turning 
around the trends in training, resources, and culture within the SSBN community? The 
answers are yet to be known. Can the Navy afford to continue on the present course with 
the risks known and unknown, with the lack of accountability with the SUBLAN? 
H. SUMMARY 
1.  Risking It All 
As mentioned earlier, risk analysis has three main deliverables:  
 identification of threats,  
 determination of the probability and impact of a threat, and  
 identification of controls and safeguards that can reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level. 
The cyber workforce is the first line of defense and their understanding of Risk in 
relation to the security of the ships networks is vitally important. The Command and 
Control element should have the basic doctrine to provide a rapid development of the 
current level of risk the network may develop at any given time. The framework for this 
doctrine is currently available at the DoD level. The next step is to implement this 




X. THE VIRTUAL SUBMARINE 
In the cyber domain, the war is clearly “in progress” so to speak. It can be seen on 
the news, in the papers, on the Internet, and U.S. Government (USG) networks. The 
nation’s cyber adversaries are working hard to penetrate USG networks. To assume that 
adversaries are not after operational and technical information and not trying to cause 
disruption to the Command and Control decision making process would be a gross 
conceptual error (COMSUBFOR 2011, 1). 
The United States (U.S.) military should not be considered the only target. The 
defense industry and the government as a whole should also be considered at risk. 
Working towards a common goal of hardening the IA Defense-in-Depth boundaries will 
be the strongest defense and if necessary, the strongest offense. The current levels of 
training for U.S. sailors, while improving, are still inadequate to the task of having a 
sufficient level of IA for defense against cyber warfare. The submarine force  has an 
inadequate level of knowledge and manpower in this area for both the submarine officer 
and enlisted communities.  
Every submarine has physical brow for boarding. A person is required to  
 show proper identification,  
 ask for permission to come aboard,  
 grant permission  and then  
 provide access to the submarine.  
Sometimes, a person is escorted onto the submarine and is given limited access to 
sensitive areas.  
Each submarine has a virtual brow as well, that spans from the ship’s network to 
the outside world. Conceptually, this virtual brow’s security controls should work the 
same way as the physical brow of the submarine, if not better. The security controls must 
work better because it is anticipated that the next major conflict for the U.S. military will 
not be using conventional warfare; it could be a virtual cyber conflict and one that is 
already in progress.  
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In order to change the mindset to grasp the concept of the virtual brow, the 
Submarine Force should strive to stop thinking about Information Systems solely as an 
oversight of SUBLAN, but rather expand the definition to include all the hardware, 
software, interconnecting systems, security controls, operations and maintenance 
processes that go into the movement of critical information from source to the decision-
maker; in short, “End-to-End Security” that encompasses all layers of the Open Systems 
Interconnection OSI  model and makes use of the Defense-in-Depth model. In the cyber 
domain, the ship is vulnerable if informational systems are not held to the same 
operational, maintenance, quality assurance, and defensive standards that would be 
applied to propulsion, ship control, weapons, navigation, combat, and the sailors who 
operate and maintain those ship systems. 
For example, a well-run ship has a thorough zone inspection program. Every 
space is inspected; deficiencies are noted and corrective actions are taken. The virtual 
ship should be held to the same standard. Software applications that do not work should 
be considered as similar to other parts of the real ship that do not work. If the virtual ship 
were inspected at the same level as the physical ship, then software version control would 
be held to be as just as important as material configuration control. Maintaining the latest 
operating systems, applications, and so on would be a high priority, and so on. Old files 
on servers creating a digital landfill would be considered to be as problematic as physical 
trash building up in the operating spaces (COMSUBFOR 2011, 1). 
The cyber domain presents clear and present risk to the USG and military 
operations and every maritime participant who shares information resources with the 
submarine force. Because of the wide-reach of the cyber-domain, then it follows that 
cyber domain security should be the business of commanders, and not completely be 
delegated to LAN administrators; commanding officers and executive officers need to 
ensure that an understanding of IT/IA Concept of Operations (CONOPS)  is part of their 
knowledge base. The primary reason for this is that knowledge of IT/IA CONOPS relates 
directly to war fighting ability. Success will require the participation of every submariner. 
A deeper understanding of the virtual ship—where straightforward action, as well as 
  
65 
long-term vigilance is required—will set a new normal for IT operations, so as to 
strengthen the virtual brow in the cyber war-fighting domain. 
A. SUMMARY 
The virtual submarine did not exist a decade ago. However, the submarine force 
cannot dismiss the very real, asymmetric threat operating today. The dependence on the 
movement of information brings with it real responsibility to understand and to manage. 
In the cyber domain, as in every other war fighting domain, the Submarine Force must be 
ready (COMSUBFOR 2011, 1). While the principles that have been learned over the last 
few decades of operating submarines should apply to the virtual submarine as well, they 
do not; we continue to fall short of putting that theory to practice. Senior deckplate 
leadership should strive to grasp this new battlespace that takes place in virtual domain. 








There are significant gaps in the United States Navy (USN) Submarine Force’s 
ability to integrate and manage Information Assurance requirements (IA), Information 
Technology (IT) manpower, End-to-End security, IT equipment, IT training, and 
applicable documentation that meets the intent of the “Design for Submarine Warfare” 
initiative promulgated in July 2011 The DUSW’s intent is to have a shared sense of main 
objectives, and to align multiple efforts.” (Caldwell, Richardson, and Breckenridge 
2011). 
Furthermore, the Submarine Force lacks common criteria for IA integration as a 
system of systems (SoS), when such an SoS is defined as a structured methodology to 
standardize and document IA requirements, IT requirements management, IT manpower, 
end-to-end security paralleled with end-to-end reliability, IT equipment and training, IA 
physical/functional/behavioral network boundaries, and applicable documentation that 
meets the intent of the “New Design for Submarine Warfare” initiative. 
The research addressed the questions of “How can the Submarine Force better 
prepare and improve its Information Technician (IT) personnel, equipment, and training 
to meet increasing submarine warfare requirements worldwide?  How can this be 
accomplished while employing undersea forces and delivering future undersea 
warfighting capabilities without further unnecessarily sacrificing valuable monetary and 
manpower resources?” 
Furthermore, this research analyzed the capability of the Submarine Force’s “New 
Design for Undersea Warfare” (DUSW) initiative, described as the ability to “fight our 
virtual ship in the cyber domain as capably as we do in the undersea domain” (Caldwell 
and Richardson 2011, 4). 
The aim of this research was to provide submarine combatant commanders, 
submarine type commanders, submarine squadron commodores, and submarine afloat 
commanding officers with an improved comprehension of the concepts necessary for the 
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Submarine Force’s ability to fight the virtual ship in the cyber domain as capably as the 
undersea domain. The term virtual ship should not imply improved information systems 
but rather a comparison of warfare in a physical battle space of either land, air, or sea 
with the virtual concept of network warfare. 
The following sections provide answers to the research questions and a 
comprehensive summary of findings and conclusions.  
A. END TO END SECURITY CONCEPT 
End-to-end security is complete data protection from writer to reader as the data 
travels through the entire OSI and TCP/IP model. Due to advancement in 
hardware/firmware, the easiest and most popular protection model is within a network’s 
infrastructure. Simple network access via a token or common access card will not provide 
end-to-end security unless that model is applied and ends at application Layer 7. But, if 
protection is applied to the data from writer to reader and not just the communications 
infrastructure alone, then true end-to-end security starts and ends at (application) Layer 7, 
before data is sent on the network to the end user. Therefore, end-to-end security 
measures cannot be truly solved at any layers lower than that without addressing the 
entire OSI/TCP/IP model working together within the IA trade space as a System of 
Systems.  
The development of the TCP and IP parallels the development of the OSI model. 
IP is connectionless and stateless which means that there’s no sense of end-to-end 
connections. Packets of data can get lost for many reasons, but the connectionless nature 
of IP means that we have a dynamite ability to transparently add alternate routes and 
improve system availability.  
IT operators and system administrators must understand the concept of end-to-end 
security so as to put in place necessary measures for a proper end-to-end security model. 
Lack of understanding of this concept by submarine network program managers 
inadvertently causes a lack of acquisition and policy support necessary to keep up with 
dynamic network security measures. Senior leadership should understand the end-to-end 
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security concept in order to understand the cause and effect on overall ship mission and 
support functions. They need to know what questions to ask and demand closure from 
TYCOM via the program managers. 
B. TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN PRODUCT ARCHITECTURE 
It is important to understand the advances in technology that have changed 
product architecture. That product was, and still is, the Internet and its ability to function 
the way it does. Normally a demand will drive a product to be developed for s specific 
purpose. In the case of the concept of the Internet as now known, advancement 
technology itself was the main driver behind the Internet architecture. This advancement 
in technology was felt in the Navy and submarine force and was well taken advantage of 
for the next step in the Navy and submarine force’s Information Technology ambitions. 
C. IT21 TO ITS 
The Navy’s IT-21 program was off to a good start with establishing a plan to 
modernize, standardize, and take advantage of the new networking technology that 
enabled Command to communicate in a non-traditional fashion with a non-traditional 
system that was maintained by non-traditional sailors as a collateral duty. IT-21 worked 
for many years until networking became less of a luxury and more of a requirement. IT-
21 program was not updated as fast as technology and the demand for connectivity 
increased. Subsequently, the need for higher trained and dedicated operators, technicians, 
and officers also increased. Almost two decades later it became apparent that the concept 
of a new battlespace may exist and a new design to deal with that battlespace and 
revitalize traditional battlespace warfare was needed. 
D. DESIGN FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE 
DUSW is a plan to get the submarine force on a new dead reckoning course. Even 
with some minor shortfalls with DUSW addressing Lines of Effort for IA/IT/LAN 
systems, programs, and personnel, a deeper reach to leverage the proper level of experts 
already embedded in the submarine force will ensure the DUSW spirit of intent behind 
those LOEs.  
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E. INFORMATION ASSURANCE PHYSICAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND 
BEHAVIORIAL BOUNDARIES 
The concept of IA boundaries as it relates to the DiD model and OSI model is 
relatively new suggestion. With a basic understanding of those models and IA, a direct 
correlation can be observed. With a basic understanding of IA and the operation of those 
systems that this research addresses, the concept of IA boundaries can be understood by 
operators, technicians, PMs, and leadership. IT operators and technicians are among the 
highest priority to understand this concept and manage all of the IA requirements 
management. But it will require new personnel, training, and leadership: a new human 
capital strategy. How will the submarine force build these enlisted ranks with the proper 
Navy Enlisted Education Code (NEC) and training while managing the overall manpower 
and resources for the submarine missions that rely on complex networks?  
Through the study of Systems Architecture and reviewing IA holistically as a 
system of systems, IA boundaries can be identified. For example: 
 Physical security layer is directly related to this physical IA boundary.  
 The functional boundary correlates to the host security, internal network, 
and perimeter security Defense in Depth layers.  
The behavioral boundary correlates to the data security layer that deals with 
application and data. 
F. HUMAN CAPITAL STRATEGY 
When reviewing this problem, it is possible to observe that there are two 
significant, but unofficial, types of submarine Information Technicians. The first type is 
the Information Technician who has been fully converted with the 2791 NEC, filling the 
Information Technician billet in accordance with the LAN stabilization message, but is 
being leveraged to work outside the LAN division supporting that sailor’s division and 
rate; the LAN is treated as a secondary and collateral duty.  
The second type of Information Technician is that sailor who is working in the 
Information Technician division either as a part-time collateral duty or full-time, but who 
is not a fully converted information technician. This is clearly poor personnel 
  
71 
management, due to observations previously mentioned above and misplaced 
contributions by sailors being tooled and used for one job, yet being tested and advanced 
in rate in which they have not functioned  for an extended period of time. The author of 
this thesis can only observe this is a lack of sensitivity to a core group of sailors forced to 
take care of the ship’s network; what once was considered a collateral duty has become a 
full-time job. However, this task is still treated as though it is a collateral duty. Needs, 
requirements, and functions must synchronize. 
G. IA REQUIREMENTS MANAGEMENT 
IA requirements levied across the DoD and related domains continue to evolve, 
increasing in number and complexity. The impact of this at the afloat/tactical command 
level culminates in a significant impact in the ability to effectively manage these 
requirements. Without a management solution, coupled with the limited ability to obtain 
and maintain the requisite IA and related skill sets at this level, what is created is an 
increased threat to data, systems, networks, significant expenditure of associated 
resources/man hours and overall mission capability. The submarine force already 
maintains an experienced officer corps that requires additional IT/IA training. In order to 
support to the full potential of the intent of DUSW, the return of the submarine Warrant 
Officer directly commissioned from the ITS rate will pay priceless dividends for the 
submarine force.  
The proposed IA requirements manager (officer or civilian) solution approach is 
intended to incorporate detailed/system TYCOM, ISIC and afloat command specific 
information of GENSER and DoDIIS IA requirements, providing a Subject Matter Expert 
(SME) based single point of reference facilitating training, visibility, and proactive 
management of all IA requirements at all levels of submarine TYCOM, ISIC and afloat 
command level. (General Service/Collateral (GENSER) requirements are applicable to 
systems processing for CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET, and Special 
Compartment Information (SCI) level information. An additional, commonly overlooked, 
duty of an IA requirements manager should be establishing and maintaining an 
administrative risk assessment program for the submarine networks. Even a basic 
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qualitative risk assessment process for the Commanding Officer and ITS division would 
provide understandable mitigations for network vulnerabilities. 
H. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk analysis has three main deliverables:  
 identification of threats,  
 determination of the probability and impact of a threat, and  
 identification of controls and safeguards that can reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level. 
The cyber workforce is the first line of defense and their understanding of Risk in 
relation to the security of the ships networks is vitally important. The Command and 
Control element should have the basic doctrine to provide a rapid development of the 
current level of risk the network may develop at any given time. The framework for this 
doctrine is currently available at the DoD level. The next step is to implement this 
framework down to the TYCOM and afloat unit level to keep our virtual submarine 
secure. 
I. THE VIRTUAL SUBMARINE 
The virtual submarine did not exist a decade ago. However, the submarine force 
cannot dismiss the very real, asymmetric threat operating today. The dependence on the 
movement of information brings with it real responsibility to understand and to manage. 
In the cyber domain, as in every other war fighting domain, the Submarine Force must be 
ready (COMSUBFOR 2011, 1). While the principles that have been learned over the last 
few decades of operating submarines should apply to the virtual submarine as well, they 
do not; we continue to fall short of putting that theory to practice. Senior deckplate 
leadership should strive to grasp this new battlespace that takes place in virtual domain. 





Organizational governance must raise the level of awareness as to network 
security protection. In this case, protection means the IA on the devices that store, 
manipulate and transmit information through equipment, people and procedures. Security 
is a discipline that starts with ethics and training. The organization, or Command, should 
take the responsibility to set ethical behavioral standards and train shipboard personnel so 
that they understand the standards as set forth by the leadership. These standards can, 
therefore, be reflected in the next update of the Design for Undersea Warfare. 
Training, personnel, and equipment, along with confidentiality, 
integrity/authenticity, and availability of information should connect with ethics and 
security practices for total End-to-End Security. Organizations need to set solid IA policy 
that outlines how an organization collects, uses, and protects the data stored within the 
digital landfill for command and control information. An independent broker, trusted 
agent, or IA requirements manager could provide the needed assurance that information 
from submarines will be re-protected. Otherwise, the course submarine security is on 
could manifest into a situation that could cost DoD and the DoN a significant amount of 
money to correct. 
K. PERSONNEL 
There will be high costs to not correctly presenting the consequences if 
submarines fail in their due diligence in providing adequate training, resources, and 
security. Moreover, organizational leadership must realize that information security is a 
daunting challenge and that it is more than an Information Technology (IT) departmental 
issue. Awareness and understanding of Information Security issues must permeate all 
decisions and all ranks of the organization and not just the IT department. A paradigm 
shift in watchstanding must take place because submarine IT duties are no longer a 
collateral duty. Submarine communications division and ITS division merging will 
produce nothing but benefits and solve the manning, watchstanding, and organizational 
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challenges. The senior enlisted leadership and senior communications officer leadership 
must lead this effort with command and control element support.  
Self-monitoring could be centralized and coordinated through an independent 
broker offering up various products and services to optimize the well-being of IS 
including the security and protection of vital information that will enable submarines to 
meet their missions today and tomorrow.  
When Program Managers, Chief System Engineers, fleet representatives, et cetera 
think about acquisition requirements for IT/IA/LAN, interoperability to meet capability 
continues to miss the mark or is not considered an acquisition target when viewing IT 
architecture as a system of systems.   
L. AUTONOMY VS. MANAGEMENT 
Bits are bits and they go down the wire or over the either at the same speed 
regardless of whether they are administrative or tactical bits. So the problem has everything 
to do with an organization weighed down by bureaucracy, which in this case means the 
Submarine Force’s inability to adapt. The Submarine Force has not operated autonomously 
since reliable satellite data communications became the norm. Within one sailor generation 
later, networking became the norm and command and control changed again.  
In the corporate military, there is a very strong impetus to control and in many 
instances, that is the military’s job. But, often this controlling function means that the 
military, that means “manage,” with a very narrow practical definition. It ends up coming 
out as “we do not allow anything on the network that we have not approved” (meaning 
purchased).  
This is a long way from reality in a civilian or industry setting. The concept that 
seems to be missing as this high level discussion heads into uncharted waters is 
interoperability. Interoperability is orthogonal to ownership. There is no real need to own 
something to use it. A component does not need to be owned for it to be interoperable 
with the rest of the IT and communications infrastructure. Further, ownership does not 




 none of the solutions match the problem 
 executing the solution will, again, cause an unproductive turf war adding 
to the current ones.  
M. PLATFORM ABILITY 
Additionally, the problem viewed here can be a cross-platform service problem. 
Every information system or system that is of any real interest involves cross-platform 
service from one platform or service to another. But the entire military procurement 
system is more oriented on acquiring platforms, not cross-platform sections. Changing 
the platform-oriented habits of a few decades probably will not happen. But we can, for a 
whole lot less effort and hassle, get the IA interoperability part right. This is where 
command and control element, at the Commander O5 and Captain O6 level, along with 
our industry engineering partners are important. A more cohesive interface between the 
TYCOMS and the acquisition corps is needed. 
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The following recommendations are intended for ITS personnel, senior afloat 
leadership, ISICs, TYCOM, and Program Managers (PM) of IT systems onboard 
submarines. Some recommendations are administrative in nature while other 
recommendations are intended for PM level research. Recommendations that are 
conceptional in nature should be considered for the next review of DUSW. 
Execute a thorough inspection of our virtual submarine evaluating the content 
created on all networks and stand-alone systems. This must include portable 
workstations, all removable media, IT personnel training, IT personnel manpower, and so 
on. This effort should reduce exposure to vulnerabilities to a minimum by eliminating all 
unnecessary and out dated data; reduce and eliminate the digital landfill.  
Ensure that the classification of information is consistent with the classification 
limits of network upon which they reside. If the source is in question or cannot be found, 
proper research should be conducted at all levels.  
Minimize downloaded portable media. Store classified data on shared network 
resources instead of local workstations or individual user accounts.  
Evaluate processes for maintaining and transferring control of classified material 
for both electronic and physical. 
Formalize, standardize, and utilize end-to-end security concept. 
Redesign how formal schooling for IT fundamentals is administered. Training is 
critical to core competencies. Identifying the Submarine Force’s IT competence in 
maintaining its networks and assessing risk to virtual ships is paramount.  
Treat network hardware configurations and software environment as part of the 
weapons battery. Configuration enforcement is critical.  
Leverage groups and squadrons in supporting afloat commanding officers in the 
virtual ship domain identical to traditional core competencies with respect to with 
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waterfront expertise, monitoring, and forceful backup. This required assessment and 
management of staff competencies is an investment to bridge gaps in shipboard 
Information Assurance processes and administrative programs. 
Training should be initiated by TYCOM for officers and other leadership 
personnel in the CO/XO/NAV pipeline. They should also ensure requisite IT and IA 
knowledge, skills, and abilities are part of the newest schools. They should also provide 
the force with the policy, best practices, and supporting products to assist commanding 
officers and others who are accountable for the readiness of the virtual submarine. 
The force should be provided with an authorized, and useful, list of approved 
software applications allowed, and there should be a formal process for updating the list. 
This long list should not be created without proper level of stakeholder involvement. 
TYCOM should create an IT governance board at the Squadron and Group level for the 
sole purpose of pulling fleet requirements and issues up to the echelon two and three 
level.  
It is recommended further research and trade studies be conducted for end-to-end 
security solutions onboard submarine networks such as SUBLAN. The use of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), Common Access Card (CAC), or similar token access card used in 
conjunction with the proper application will provide end-to-end security at all layers of 
the OSI and TCP/IP model. This will not only prevent loss of sensitive information via 
loss of data, but make it easier to mitigate the insider threat.  
It is recommended further research be conducted to insert end-to-end security 
training into the submarine ITS training pipeline. Currently, the only network security 
training is the necessary material to obtain the Security Plus certification. 
Two significant recommendations can be summarized from above: 
1) All operational and administrative applications that attach to the Internet such 
as IT21, NMCI, ONENET etc..., should authenticate the data they use. No application 
should emit data that is not digitally signed. No application should naively (without 
warning the user) accept data that is not signed. 
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2) No application should emit classified data except in encrypted form. (in this 
context, application and end system should be considered synonymous. An example is 
encryption of e-mail messages. An incorrect example is relying only on VPNs. 
A. FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH 
Assign communications 6290 LDOs to at sea submarine duty as junior officers to 
act as Information Operations officers. This will put the submarine force back on track 
and further lay a proper foundation for solid cyber security in the future.  
Combine the submarine communications division and ITS division and send new 
communications ETs to more IT schools. Communications ETs are already receiving 
some IT training at A-school and ITS students are already receiving basic 
communications training as well. Currently, TYCOM senior communications department 
heads are reluctant or ill equipped to tackle such a momentous task.  
Create a submarine IT Chief Warrant Officer. The submarine force is no longer 
producing submarine electronics Chief Warrant Officers CWO due to obsolesce of that 
particular Officer designator. The vitality of a submarine IT CWO could be a cost 
effective option for an IA/IT manager for ISIC and some afloat platforms. 
Establish a new IA/Security subject requirements manager requirements manager 
position at the ISIC or Group Commander level. This position can be filled by a 6290 
LDO or civilian equivalent. This new position or the CWO position would: 
 Initiate related tiered training at the ISIC level to train and transition a 
management solution to ISIC staff and subordinate afloat units 
 Review current IA requirements and status of related documentation at the 
afloat command level to establish a status baseline among subordinate 
afloat units 
 Establish a liaison with DoD / DoN level authorities at ISIC level 
Identify specific “taxonomy of threat sources capable of imitating threat events”  
(NIST 800–30 Rev1 2012, D-1) onboard submarines. 
Capture reliability data to provide sufficient context to provide an effective 
standard of evaluation of in-use combat system software and hardware build. 
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A. SUBLAN AND COMMON SUBMARINE RADIO ROOM ONBOARD 
ARCHECTURE 
This appendix is provided for supplemental information. The SUBLAN has 
evolved into a ship-wide network infrastructure that provides connectivity throughout the 
submarine and enables submarine subsystems to interact with off-board entities via the 
Exterior Communication Subsystem (ECS). The SUBLAN subsystems includes networks 
and other services requiring interconnecting subsystems, as well as providing fiber optic 
cables and networking services that are required within subsystems. SUBLAN 
implements a SECRET-High Classified LAN and a separate Unclassified LAN. The 
Unclassified LAN is used primarily for Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNET) access to support administrative functions and quality-of-life related 
elements. The Secret LAN provides Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 
and supports a variety of Secret (and below secret) level tasks.  
The basic configuration of SUBLAN provides network infrastructure, including 
an Unclassified Wireless LAN (UWLAN, currently not allowed), servers, and the 
Common PC Operating System Environment (COMPOSE), which provides the server 
and operating system environment for other applications such as Non-Tactical Data 
Processing (NTDPS) and Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS).  
The SUBLAN Classified and Unclassified networks connect to off-hull elements 
via the Common Submarine Radio Room’s (CSRR) Automated Digital Network System 
(ADNS) Router, which provides both RF links and links for pier side connections.  
The ADNS Hub consists of the two Main Routers in CSRR, which are the 
connecting point between the SUBLAN and CSRR.  
The Ashore side piece delineates the major elements of the submarine message 
and electronic mail flow connectivity between the SSBN and the Broadcast Control 
Authority, Naval Telecommunications and Master Station Pacific (NCTAMS PAC), and 
the rest of the world.  
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The submarine input comes into the Very Low Frequency (VLF) receivers 
onboard and transmitters ashore. After processing through the routers and Policy Router, 
the electronic mail, messages, and other information are sent via shore-side to either the 




A. DESIGN FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE 
This appendix is provided for supplemental information.  
The work of our Undersea Force is complex, dynamic and vital to national 
security. With a community as broad and diverse as ours, it is important for us to have a 
shared sense of our main objectives, and to align our efforts to achieve them. The Design 
for Undersea Warfare serves these purposes. 
The Design for Undersea Warfare is intended to be specific enough to clearly 
define the objective, while being flexible enough to encourage initiative and boldness 
throughout the force—at all levels—in the attainment of these goals. As such, it has 
implications for major commanders, facility commanders, submarine commanding 
officers, and each of our officers and Sailors. 
Main Objectives: We will be masters of the undersea domain, able to achieve 
undersea superiority at the time and place of our choosing. We will be the experts for all 
matters in undersea warfare. Consistent with decades of past performance, our Undersea 
Force will apply itself along three main lines of effort: 
 Ready Forces: Provide undersea forces ready for operations and 
warfighting 
 Effective Employment: Conduct effective forward operations and 
warfighting 
 Future Force Capabilities: Prepare for future operations and 
warfighting 
It is difficult to separate warfighting from peacetime operations, as they are so 
closely related. Our undersea forces conduct peacetime operations to prevent war, by 
deterring and dissuading our adversaries and by assuring our Allies and partners.





battlespace, and to learn the capabilities of potential adversaries. Our goal is that by 
virtue of our robust and focused operations, we will clearly be ready to prevail in any 
conflict. The warfighting readiness and effectiveness of our Undersea Force should serve 
to compel potential aggressors to choose peace rather than war, restraint rather than 
escalation, and termination rather than continuation. 
Enduring Attributes: What has not changed is that the success of our undersea 
forces depends on dedicated, technically skilled and engaged warriors. 
Areas for Greater Emphasis: There are a number of long-term national security 
trends that interact to make undersea operations and warfighting capability increasingly 
important. In light of this, you will find several Focus Areas singled out for renewed 
dedication within our force. First, there is increased emphasis on the development and 
certification of relevant warfighting skills at the unit level, at the tactical and operational 
commander level, at the strategic level, and at supporting commands. Next, you will find 
increased emphasis on creativity and innovation, sparked by initiative and a heightened 
sense of authority, responsibility, and accountability at the lowest capable level—even to 
the individual. 
This document defines our way forward in a complex and often unpredictable 
environment. As such, it will evolve—it is not a rigid plan. To ensure that necessary 
changes can occur, the Design for Undersea Warfare has assessment and learning built 
in—we will make changes as necessary. 
The Design for Undersea Warfare is a framework for action. Read it, think about 
it, discuss it and act on it. 
 
R. P. BRECKENRIDGE      J. F. CALDWELL,     JR. J. M. RICHARDSON  
Director                                            Commander                            Commander 
Submarine Force                            Submarine Warfare                 Submarine Force 





Context for the Design 
Assumptions about the world, key trends, threats 
1. A chaotic and disorderly global security environment will increase demands on 
the U.S. Navy and U.S. Undersea Forces. 
2. Globally proliferating submarines are increasing pressure on freedom of the 
seas and contesting our undersea superiority. 
3. Anti-access, Area Denial (A2/AD) systems challenge our surface and air forces, 
placing increased responsibility on our undersea forces to enable Assured Access for the 
Joint Force. 
4. America’s vital undersea infrastructure (energy and information) is becoming 
even more critical and more vulnerable. 
5. Our shrinking submarine force size requires that each platform must 
individually support more requirements across a broader area. 
6. Deterrence provided by our stealthy, agile, persistent and lethal submarines 
(SSBNs, SSNs and SSGNs) will remain important against both state and non-state actors. 
7. Ubiquitous media presence means we will need to exploit our concealment to 
provide our leadership options by remaining undetected and non-provocative when 
desired. 
8. The expanded decision space that undersea forces provide will be increasingly 
valued by senior leadership as the security environment grows in complexity, leading to 






Assumptions about the future 
1. The operational environment will become more complex, further stressing the 
human element in undersea operations and warfighting. 
2. Adaptive, determined and tenacious adversaries will exploit our weaknesses 
with little or no notice. 
3. Survivable U.S. SSBNs will provide nuclear deterrence for the United States 
and many of our allies for the foreseeable future. 
4. Combatant Commanders will continue to value the unique capabilities 
and conventional deterrence that SSNs and SSGNs deliver. 
5. Unmanned underwater system technology will advance with increased 
endurance and capability. 
6. We will need to fight our “Virtual Ship” in the cyber domain as capably as we 
fight in the undersea domain. We must protect our information and our systems from 
attack and take the fight to the enemy. 
7. Available financial resources will decrease due to budget pressures. 
 
Expectations others have of our Navy and Undersea Forces:  
We will be expected to achieve undersea superiority at the time and place of our 
choosing. 
1. We will use the Navy to gain access despite diplomatic, geographic, and 
military impediments. (CNO) 
2. We will build appropriate Navy force structure and provide it with an 
appropriate strategic lay-down. (CNO) 
3. We will provide forces ready for tasking to Combatant Commanders. (USFF) 
4. We will sustain our forces through their Expected Service Life. (USFF) 
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5. We will reduce Fleet overhead and fund deployable units at a higher priority 
than everything else. (USFF) 
6. We will win wars, deter wars, defeat terrorists, and ease disasters with our 
Maritime Forces (Cooperative Strategy for 21st  Century Sea Power)(CS-21) 
7. We will secure the U.S. from attack; secure strategic access and retain global 
freedom of action. (CS-21) 
8. We will provide persistently present, combat-ready Maritime forces capable of 
forcible entry and quick response to other crises. (CS-21) 
9. We will impose local sea control wherever necessary -- by ourselves if we 
must.  
(CS-21) 
10. We will maintain nuclear weapons safety and security. 
11. We will maintain nuclear reactor safety and security. 
12. We will maintain security of classified material and information systems. 
Priorities—Enabling Success and Managing Risk 
1. Peacetime Operational Priorities: 
 Safety: Our operational responsibilities hinge first and foremost on 
enforcing the highest standards of safety, including the prevention of collision, 
grounding, serious injury or death. 
 Stealth: Safety is closely followed by a commitment to remaining 
undetected as we execute highly sensitive missions in support of our Nation’s security. 
We must prevent counter detection, compromise of mission details, or exploitation of our 
sensitive classified information. 
 Mission Aim:  Mission accomplishment within the bounds of safety and stealth 
is our highest priority 
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2. Professional Behavior: We must embody the highest standards of character. 
At sea, we will conduct ourselves as proud warriors, worthy of bearing arms in the 
defense of our nation. Ashore, we will be ambassadors of the Nation and the Navy, 
preventing liberty or public incidents at home or abroad. The Commanding Officer must 
set a powerful example. 
 
What We Must Do: Forces that support our efforts 
Our people are the key to our success. The shared “Submarine Culture” running 
through our undersea community is our strongest supporting force. It provides us with 
our warfighting focus and our operational readiness. It must NEVER be compromised. 
Alignment: Our value as a Force is significantly enhanced when we maintain a 
coherent alignment amongst our senior leadership and with each other. We must ensure 
we remain consistent both with our broader strategic responsibilities to the Navy and with 
the other elements of the Undersea Force. 
Warfighting: 
 We expect to operate and fight far forward, independently, “behind enemy 
lines,” for long periods of time, without support 
 We maintain ourselves as ready as possible to leave soon, move quickly and be 
among the first to penetrate the enemy’s defenses 
 We know our potential adversaries and have operating experience in the 
environments that might become future undersea battlegrounds 
 We exploit concealment by the sea as a key to our success, but we respect that 
the same sea will kill us unless we hold it at bay 
 We depend on stealth, surprise and boldness and practice these 
every day. We safeguard tactical information and avoid exploitable patterns 
 We understand that operating undersea is inherently a dangerous business and 













 We understand “calculated risk” but avoid “unnecessary risk” by 
thinking ahead, anticipating risk and taking mitigating actions 
Readiness: 
 We stay ready to operate far forward on short notice by managing manpower, 
training and maintenance to avoid fluctuating readiness 
 Our people are the backbone of our success. Submariners are national 
treasures. 
 We have small crews. Each person has multiple roles. All are responsible for 
the ship’s safety, stealth and mission 
We depend on initiative, de-centralized command and teamwork 
We depend on absolute integrity. We employ back-up and second checks, but 
each person remains individually responsible. 
We comply with procedures, founded on technical understanding 
We know and use the source requirements and references 
We have no peer in our aggressive approach to improvement through assessment 
and training 
 We candidly face the facts—good and bad—and proceed based on well-known 
standards that are based on thorough analysis. 
We ensure nobody is indispensible by building depth of expertise 
We incorporate safety and effective work practices into our habits 
 We are resourceful. We always have a Plan B, and we can often fix the 
equipment even if we lack the parts 
 We own our ships, taking meticulous care to maintain them in a state of 




What We Must Avoid: Forces that work against us 
 
1. Our current approach to inspections and assessments rewards cyclic and 
temporary narrow excellence instead of excellence which is sustained and broad. 
2. Our TYCOM and ISIC efforts tend to limit a Commanding Officer’s 
freedom and flexibility. Shared responsibility and accountability between the ship 
and the chain of command is limiting CO’s ability to achieve success. Excessive 
administrative distractions are burdensome. 
3. We lose sight of the fact that warfare is a human-centric problem. 
Insufficient emphasis is given to developing creativity and initiative, both of 
which are essential to the practice of de- centralized command upon which effective 
undersea warfare is based. 





Part II Summary of the 
Design for Undersea Warfare 
Three Lines of Effort with Associated Focus Areas 
Our undersea force has long approached its responsibilities for securing national 
security along three Lines of Effort (LOEs), depicted in Figure 1. The Design for 
Undersea Warfare also identifies associated Focus Areas, which describe the emphasis 
required within each LOE. 
Design for Undersea Warfare
Ready Undersea Forces  
Provide Undersea Forces ready for 
operations and warfighting
Effective Undersea Force 
Employment
Conduct effective undersea 
operations and warfighting today
Future Undersea Force 
Capabilities
Prepare for future undersea 
operations and warfighting
Prepare undersea forces to safely 
and effectively complete 
peacetime operations directed by 
operational commanders.
Prepare undersea forces to 
effectively conduct wartime 
operations on short notice as 
directed by operational 
commanders.
Develop and refine through 
experimentation the command 
and control doctrine and TTP for 
the Undersea Warfare 
Commander for manned and 
unmanned systems.
Optimally employ our 
undersea forces 
independently or as part of a 
team in support of 
operational or warfighting 
responsibilities.
Reliably and professionally 
accomplish the missions 
tasked by the operational 
commanders while 
effectively managing risk and 
stealth.
Be ready to go to war and 
immediately execute the 
combatant commander’s 
direction.
Define the future role of 
undersea forces in both 
operations and warfighting, 
mindful of the changing 
technology and security 
environment.
Determine platform, 
payload, payload volume, 
people and posture 
requirements. Coordinate 
future missions with other 
warfare communities.
Translate requirements into 


















Each of the three Lines of Effort has associated Focus Areas: 
Ready Forces -- Provide Undersea Forces Ready for Operations and 
Warfighting:  
This captures our responsibility to prepare undersea forces for scheduled or 
emergent deployments as well as warfighting. The time horizon for this Line of Effort is 
roughly five years. 
Focus Areas: 
 Enhance CO initiative and character, including the responsibility, authority, 
and accountability to prepare the ship for operations and warfighting; structure the 
relationship with Squadrons, Groups and Type Commanders to shift the responsibility for 
preparation, planning, execution, assessment and improvement more to the ship. 
Maximize CO effectiveness by nurturing character and integrity at every opportunity. 
 Sustain warfighting readiness during the inter-deployment period; adjust the 
interaction within the chain of command to reward stable, broad excellence vice short-
term, cyclic pulses; return tactical initiative to the operating forces 
 Develop Undersea Warfare Commander Doctrine and TTP; integrated 
C2 for both manned and unmanned undersea systems; practices for effective 
coordination of mixed undersea forces with other forces 
Effective Employment -- Conduct Effective Undersea Operations and 
Warfighting:  
This captures our responsibility to work with operational commanders to be ready 
to establish undersea superiority at the time and place of our choosing.  
Effectively employ undersea forces to reliably and professionally deliver the 
operational and warfighting performance expected by the Combatant Commanders.




 Active engagement with Fleet and Operational Commanders to develop 
coordinated theater specific campaign plans that optimally employ our undersea forces; 
enhance development of innovative strategic and tactical employment of undersea forces 
(e.g., C7F Submarine Campaign Plan and supporting CSP Submarine Response Plan); 
tighten our assessment processes with Operational Commanders and supporting players 
to make us more effective warfighters. 
 Increase the deliberate and planned demonstration of warfighting 
capabilities and access at the submarine and force level enhancing confidence in our 
abilities and systematically proving we can do what’s required; lead in development of 
Theater USW Doctrine and teamwork; improve Mission Assurance to ensure we can fight 
through a range of C4I challenges in peacetime and war 
 Improve operational availability of undersea forces while forward (through 
improved resilience, achieve better reliability, on-board repair, in-theater repair) 
Future Force Capabilities -- Prepare for Future Undersea Operations and 
Warfighting:  
This defines the future role of undersea forces, the associated requirements for 
platforms, payloads, manpower and operations, and the decisions, policies and resourcing 
required.  
The time horizon for this Line of Effort is roughly five years and beyond 
Focus Areas: 
 Develop an integrated approach to future undersea capabilities 
that coordinates platform, payload volume, payload, people and force posture 
plans; link the plan to require near term decisions or investments; take necessary actions 
to evolve tactical security in the face of anticipated threat improvements 
 Outline the strategy to continue to access, train, and retain the very best 
people that will fill our ranks. This will require creative approaches to find and attract 
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the best and the brightest that the nation has to offer—people of character and integrity, 
technically skilled, with personal and leadership abilities. 
 Define the future role of undersea forces to make best use of undersea 
concealment for national security, incorporating hedging strategies to accommodate 
uncertainty in global trends, technology and adversary’s capability and intent 
 Obtain SSBN, SSGN, SSN and Payload decisions to address SSBN 
requirements, SSGN replacement, the SSN force structure shortfall, and emergent 
payload requirements 
Part III Detailed Discussion of Each Line of Effort 
Ready Forces: 
Providing Undersea Forces Ready for Operations and Warfighting Goals 
1. Prepare undersea forces to safely and effectively complete peacetime 
operations directed by operational commanders. These operations will also support 
warfighting effectiveness. 
2. Prepare undersea forces to effectively conduct wartime operations on short 
notice as directed by operational commanders. 
3. Develop and refine, through experimentation, the command and control 
doctrine and TTP for the Undersea Warfare Commander for manned and unmanned 
systems. 
In reaching these goals, our process must certify that the quality of provided 
forces meets standards. Furthermore, the process must be sustainable. It must not depend 
on shifting material and manpower excessively from one submarine to another in order to 
meet short-term commitments. 
Ready Forces: 




 Enhance CO initiative and character, responsibility, authority, and 
accountability to prepare the ship for operations and warfighting; structure the 
relationship with squadrons, groups and type commanders to shift the center of gravity 
for preparation, planning, execution, assessment and certification more to the ship; 
emphasize CO ability to distinguish acceptable risk from undue risk. Enhance CO 
effectiveness by nurturing integrity and a strong character at every opportunity. 
 Adopt a culture of sustained warfighting readiness during the inter-
deployment period; adjust the interaction within the chain of command to reward stable, 
broad excellence vice short-term, cyclic pulses; return tactical initiative to the operating 
forces.  
Mindset: “This is the last week of peace before going to war.” 
 Develop Undersea Warfare Commander Doctrine and TTP; integrated 
C2 for both manned and unmanned undersea systems; practices for effective 
coordination of mixed undersea forces with other forces. 
Ready Forces: 
Detailed Application of the Focus Areas 
1. Personnel Readiness:   
Improve the accession, training, and retention of our people. This will be done 
through Systematic Rating Deep Dives (FIT), Unplanned Losses (UPLs) Deep Dive, 
follow-up on Engineering Department Master Chief (EDMC) community corrective 
actions. Enhance Sailor and Family resiliency with a systematic approach to preparing 
our Sailors and their families for submarine duty responsibilities. Improve the 
effectiveness of the officer career training pipeline, providing a more coherent, career 
approach towards developing a submarine Commanding Officer—including more 
deliberate emphasis on the developmental role of sea tours. 
2. Fleet Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP):  Revise the FRTP to increase the 
amount of time available for the ship’s Commanding Officer and ISIC to effectively train 
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their crews. Lengthen FRTP underway periods to increase stable, at-sea training time. 
Increase CO latitude in tailoring submarine schedules. 
3. Training: Update the Continuing Training Manual (CTM) and Continuing 
Training Support System (CTSS) to provide COs more useful assistance on how to build 
a successful training program. (Examples: better planning tools, Force Exam Bank use, 
alignment of qualification and training, and better tracking in CTSS). While 
maintaining the predominantly human element in training, consider approaches to 
“distance support” for training, particularly in examinations. Establishing a 
predominantly watch-team approach to operational training. 
4. Assessment:Provide an instruction that describes assessment as a means for 
improvement. Shift the emphasis from external (ISIC) “exam workups” in support of 
“snapshot” assessments, to developing and evaluating a submarine crew’s ability to 
assess itself, correct and improve itself, and establish a mindset of sustained, broad 
superior performance. Adjust engagement at the ship, ISIC and TYCOM levels to focus 
on developing the mindset and behaviors for sustained performance, while shifting the 
center of gravity for assessment and improvement to the submarine and CO. As a 
supporting action, achieve a more “steady strain” approach to readiness by considering 
more unscheduled exams (e.g. TREs and ORSEs). Ensure that exams include an 
assessment of the “sustaining” mindset and behaviors on board the submarine. 
5. Maintenance/Materiel:  As we have throughout our history, we will set and 
achieve uncompromising standards of material readiness—our environment demands 
nothing less. 
Intermediate Maintenance: Reduce lost operating days and degraded readiness 
due to maintenance schedule overruns by optimizing the planning and scheduling of 
maintenance periods within the FRTP and during refits. Manage transitions (first/last 
100 hours) more tightly, emphasize planning, strict control of growth/new work and 
adherence to key events schedule. 
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Depot Maintenance: Control duration and cost by better planning and transition 
management. Work with NAVSEA to shorten SSBN ERO duration. Manage depot 
maintenance transition with rigor similar to deploying a ship. Forecast work package 
requirements via more accurate Technical Foundation Papers to enable proper Shipyard 
loading and resourcing. Work with NAVSEA to establish better execution and planning 
metrics. 
Modernization: Focus modernization efforts to more concisely address improved 
human-systems interfaces and reduced training burdens while improving the capabilities 
and reliability of key sensors such as towed arrays and photonics masts. Better balance 
operational requirements, fiscal realities, and sustainability in the COTS strategy. 
Supply: Improve sustainment and reduce cannibalization by better supply support 
(particularly Virginia class) and proactive management of onboard and off hull supply 
parts with NAVSEA and NAVSUP partners. 
6. Develop Undersea Warfare Commander Doctrine: Formalize standardized 
doctrine and procedures for coordinating the operations and effects of the full range of 
undersea systems with special emphasis on incorporating unmanned undersea systems 
into broad Navy operations. Anticipate emerging changes in communications, 
networking and autonomous operations to keep TTP current. 
Effective Employment: 
Conducting Effective Undersea Operations and Warfighting Today 
Goals: 
1. Optimally employ our undersea forces independently or as part of a team in 
support of our operational or warfighting responsibilities. 
2. Reliably and professionally accomplish the missions tasked by the operational 
commanders while effectively managing risk and stealth. 




This objective is about establishing undersea superiority at the time and place of 
our choosing through the optimum employment of undersea forces. It involves every 
element from the deliberate advanced planning of forward operations and SSBN patrols 
to the conduct of combat operations. 
Effective Employment: 
Focus Areas for increased emphasis 
 Active engagement with Fleet and Operational Commanders to develop 
coordinated theater specific campaign plans that optimally employ our undersea forces; 
enhance development of innovative strategic and tactical employment of undersea forces 
(e.g., C7F Submarine Campaign Plan and supporting CSP Submarine Response Plan); 
tighten our assessment processes with Operational Commanders and supporting players 
to make us more effective warfighters. 
 Increase the deliberate and planned demonstration of warfighting capabilities 
and access at the submarine and force level enhancing confidence in our abilities and 
systematically proving we can do what’s required; lead in development of Theater USW 
Doctrine and teamwork; improve Mission Assurance to ensure we can fight through a 
range of C4I challenges in peacetime and war 
 Improve operational availability of undersea forces while forward (through 
improved resilience, achieve, on-board repair, in-theater repair) 
Effective Employment: 
Detailed Application of the Focus Areas 
1. Theater Specific Employment Planning—Submarine Campaign Plans:  
Formally coordinate and proactively engage Fleet and Operational commanders to 
thoroughly understand theater OPLANs, required capabilities (including access) and 
gaps. Encourage creative employment of submarines and undersea assets to conduct 
forward operations that improve our warfighting readiness and take advantage of our full 
range of capabilities (e.g., SSGN). Working closely with operational commanders, build 
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a multi-year employment plan and theater-specific Submarine Campaign Plans. By 
necessity, plans must include solutions to warfighting in communications degraded 
environments. Integrate innovative demonstrations of undersea force employment or 
warfighting capabilities into deployments. Integrate capability development into the 
preparation of Ready Forces. 
2. Operating Our Ships—Developing Confidence and Demonstrating 
Operational and Warfighting Excellence:  
Exploit opportunities to enable COs and crews to operate in anticipated wartime 
areas, walk the battlefield, prove access and demonstrate warfighting skills and postures 
(e.g., operations in degraded C2/GPS, operational agility , application of wartime ROE, 
in-theater torpedo firings, SSBN patrols uninterrupted by “Brief Stops,” etc).
 Systematically test and evolve guidance based on lessons learned and experience 
gained. Conduct entire deployments or patrols at heightened stealth postures; assess 
stealth in-situ with short notice planned events (e.g., P3, SECEX). Exploit real world and 
exercise opportunities to incorporate unmanned systems (aerial and underwater) into 
forward operations and warfighting demonstrations. Provide feedback to help evolve 
USW Commander Doctrine and better leverage the capabilities of our undersea platforms 
and supporting forces. Include COs in the development of operational orders including 
proposed tasking, identification of best practices and pitfalls, and required mission 
rehearsals. Increase attention to “calculated risk” versus “undue risk.” 
3. Sustaining Our Advantage—Forward Materiel Availability: Sustain the 
availability of essential systems in forward areas by improved reliability, logistic support, 
at-sea repair capacity and back- up/redundant modes of operation.  Increase expected 
availability of tenders in Phase 0 and wartime. Submarine sensors, antennas, DSE support 
equipment, fire control and weapons require improved forward availability, as does 
IUSS-related equipment. Improve forward ordnance availability. Demonstrate 
warfighting support such as in-theater reloading, at-sea resupply, remote site maintenance 
and other required skills. 
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4. Sustaining the Fight—Mission Assurance: Ensure our readiness to support the 
Operational Commander throughout a range of C4I challenges in peacetime and war.
 Build on existing collaboration and coordination between Submarine Operating 
Authorities to ensure seamless undersea support to the warfighter. Review, assess, and 
improve Continuity of Operations Plans. 
5. Assessing Our Performance—Feedback to Make Us Better: Establish tighter 
feedback to the submarine preparation process from operational commanders, other 
forces and the intelligence community regarding forward operations. Formally assess 
training doctrine, tactical development, tactical security, modernization plans, concepts of 
operation, system performance, and forward maintenance practices. Scrutinize Tier 2/3 
events and formalize lessons-learned. Assess likely future warfighting environments and 
determine what is necessary for success and make the necessary adjustments across the 
Force. 
Future Force Capabilities: 
Preparing for Future Undersea Operations and Warfighting 
Goals: 
1. Define the future role of undersea forces in both operations and warfighting. 
2. Determine platform, payload, payload volume, people and posture 
requirements. 
3. Coordinate future missions with other warfare communities. 
4. Translate requirements into decisions, policy and funding. 
This area of effort deals with the future beyond the next five years and must take 
into consideration uncertainty about future projections. There are, however, some factors 
that can be reliably foreseen: by the existing program of record, the number of nuclear 
submarines will shrink by about 30 percent over the next 20 years. By 2030, our forward 
presence will decline by more than 40 percent and our undersea strike capacity will drop 
by almost 60 percent. Despite these trends, there is every reason to believe that the future 
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of naval warfare will place increasing, and not decreasing demands on undersea forces.
 This divergence of resources and demands places ever greater stress on the 
importance of an integrated approach for our future undersea capability development. 
Future Force Capabilities: Focus Areas for increased emphasis 
 Define the future role of undersea forces to make best use of undersea 
concealment for national security, incorporating hedging strategies to accommodate 
uncertainty in global trends, technologies and adversaries 
 Develop an Integrated Undersea Future Strategy to align requirements for 
platforms, payloads, payload volume, people and force posture 
 Obtain SSBN, SSGN, SSN and Payload decisions to address SSBN 
requirements, SSGN replacement, the SSN force structure shortfall, and emergent 
payload requirements 
Future Force Capabilities: Detailed Application of the Focus Areas 
1. Future Role of Undersea Forces—Long Term Undersea Warfighting Vision: 
Create a clear and broadly accepted vision of the growing importance of undersea forces 
in a future with increasing anti-access area-denial (A2AD) systems. Refine Navy and 
Joint Force understanding of the importance of undersea concealment to maritime 
military success. Advocate the implementation of the “Concept for Leveraging the 
Undersea Environment.”  Highlight the distinction between A2AD defense, penetration 
and defeat. 
2. Future Payload, Platform, Payload Volume, People and Posture – 
Integrated Undersea Future Strategy: 
Platforms: Determine requirements for OHIO Replacement SSBN and its impact 
on SSGN replacement. Determine requirements for SSGN replacement and 
implications on SSBNs and SSNs. Determine approach for dealing with the SSN 
shortfall after 2024 and how that impacts SSGN replacement options. 
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Payload Volume: Consider the merits of the Virginia Payload Module to replace 
lost payload volume (distributed vs. concentrated firepower). Plan to simplify payload 
interfaces. 
Payloads: Enhance the military utility of existing payloads through incremental 
evolutionary changes without needing new programs. Plan to resume torpedo production.
 Determine new payloads required and their impact on payload volume needs.
 Consider future sonar system requirements. Conduct liaison with SOCOM to 
determine the way ahead for SOF payloads. Align payloads with evolving tactical 
security needs. 
People: Determine system and payload changes (sonar, fire control, software, etc.) 
to enable reduced manning. Identify means to promote increased operational efficiency. 
Anticipate and define necessary new skill sets, then determine how best to recruit, train 
and retain them. 
Posture: Identify the implications to future operations given different force levels, 
payloads, basing and manning schemes. Determine how best to operationally integrate 
diverse undersea systems, including UUVs, in the future. Refine the mission area of 
subsea warfare and the systems/operations needed to carry it out. 
3. Long-term decisions, policies and funding—SSBN, SSGN, SSN and 
Payload decisions: 
SSBN: Attain decisions on the OHIO Replacement capabilities, including stealth, 
survivability, and sustainment model. Ensure long- term continuity of sea-based strategic 
deterrence. 
SSGN: Attain decisions on replacement of SSGN capacity when SSGNs retire, 
including Virginia Payload Module R&D and procurement funding. 
SSN: Attain and sustain two-per-year procurement of Virginia-class SSNs. 
 Gain support for extending the life of selected SSNs to help fill the SSN shortfall 
without impacting the plan for SSN replacement. Defer the “New SSN” while continuing 
  
103 
procurement of additional Blocks of VA-class SSNs with associated incremental 
enhancements until after completion of OHIO Replacement class procurement. 
Payloads: Encourage the development of undersea payloads by other resource 
sponsors, including Conventional Prompt Global Strike (OSD), Large Displacement 
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (LDUUV)(N2/N6), next generation SOF vehicles 
(SOCOM), and Distributed Netted Systems. 
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